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Abstract
        Many legal rules turn on a party’s state of mind – or intent – with
respect to some action or consequence.  Legal scholars have long debated
the contours of such requirements and the sorts of proof required for them.
Intent has been an especially controversial issue in antitrust law.  This paper
provides a theory of legal standards that explains the role of intent analysis
in antitrust and in other areas of the law.  We argue that intent requirements,
and many other legal rules, can be understood by focusing on the goal of
minimizing the expected costs from legal errors.  After developing a
positive theory of intent standards, we apply the theory to antitrust to show
that it explains both the allocation of and proof requirements for the specific
intent standards in antitrust doctrine.  We then use the Microsoft case as a
concrete study of the function of intent rules in antitrust.
*Dean and Melville Madison Bigelow Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law; senior fellow, International Centre for Economic Research.
**Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
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I. Introduction
Many legal rules turn on a party’s state of mind—or intent—with respect to
some action or consequence.  Legal scholars and jurists long have debated
the contours of such requirements and the sorts of proof required for them.1
In recent years, intent has been an especially controversial issue in
antitrust law.  The controversy encompasses both the conspiracy (Section 1)
and monopolization (Section 2) provisions of the Sherman Act, though the
bulk of the controversy involves monopolization cases. Some scholars have
urged courts to try to discover the monopolist’s subjective intent by
examining internal corporate memoranda and comments by officers of the
firm.2  Others have argued that the intent inquiry should play no role at all in
* Dean and Melville Madison Bigelow Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law;
senior fellow, International Centre for Economic Research.
** Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial and administrative support provided by
Boston University, the International Centre for Economic Research, and Microsoft
Corporation.  We also thank Joe Brodley, Vic Khanna, Susan Koniak, Eric Rasmusen, and
Ken Simons for helpful comments, and to Brian Kaiser, Alissa Kaplan, Pete Rinato, and
Russell Sweet for research assistance.  Each co-author blames the other for any remaining
errors.
1 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992); John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty By Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999); Vic Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty
Notion: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999); Richard J. Lazarus,
Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law: Reading Supreme Court Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHAM
ENV. L. J. 861 (1996); Michael S. Moore, Causation and Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091
(1985); Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
HASTINGS L. J. 815 (1980); Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79  VA. L. REV.
741 (1993); Francis Bowe Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932).  For perhaps the
earliest treatment of the intent issue in the context of antitrust law, see Alfred E. Kahn,
Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 28, 48-54 (1953)(discussing role of intent
examination in rule-of-reason analysis).
2 See, e.g., See United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) & State
of New York ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.
D.C.), cross-examination testimony of Franklin M. Fisher, Jun. 3, 1999, a.m. sess., trans. at
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monopolization cases.3  In a famous attempt to eliminate the intent inquiry
from the monopolization case law, Judge Hand declared in Alcoa that “no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.”4
This paper provides a theory of legal standards that explains and justifies
the role of intent analysis in antitrust law.  We argue that the structure of
many legal rules can be understood by focusing on the goal of minimizing
the costs from legal errors. Although we focus on antitrust law, the
framework presented here is more general and is capable of explaining rules
in other areas of the law.
Our theory rejects the two extreme normative positions on the role of
intent—on the one hand, the view that intent should play no role in legal
analysis, and, on the other hand, the view that intent should be determined
for most purposes in antitrust law by a subjective inquiry.  Our theory
supports intent standards for antitrust quite similar to the doctrines courts
are actually applying.
The argument below proceeds in two steps.  First, we identify the legal
standards applied in the antitrust case law, and, second, we present a theory
that explains the standards.
As a general proposition, the case law suggests that plaintiffs must meet a
higher burden with respect to defendant’s intent under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act than is typically required under Section 1.  Under Section 1,
plaintiffs generally must demonstrate only that the defendant intended to
engage in the conduct that is asserted to violate the law.5  Under Section 2,
plaintiffs must produce evidence that is consistent with a specific intent to
monopolize, in the sense that the overwhelming—perhaps the sole—purpose
of the defendant’s conduct is to reduce competition.6   The Section 2
specific intent standard constrains courts from penalizing a dominant firm
when its conduct involves a mixture of potentially pro-consumer and
competition-restricting actions.  This standard, as would be expected of any
optimal proof standard, minimizes the costs of error in applying Section 2.
33-34 [hereinafter, Fisher Cross]; Daniel Gifford, The Role of the Ninth Circuit in the
Development of the Law of Attempt to Monopolize, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1021-23
(1986) (specific intent evidence resolves ambiguities surrounding defendant’s conduct).
3 See, e.g., FRANKLIN M. FISHER, JOHN J. MCGOWAN & JOEN A. GREENWOOD, FOLDED,
SPINDLED AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM 272 (Cambridge: MIT
Press 1983).  See also Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly:
Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 652 (1999).
4 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
5 See discussion infra II.B.  As explained below, in some instances (such as an agreement to
fix prices) proof of the conduct that violates the law very strongly suggests an intent that is
antithetical to ordinary competition.  Separate proof of such an intent, however, is not
required.
6 See discussion infra II.C.
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Our use of the term specific intent here is not synonymous with subjective
intent, although that is the sense in which the term is used at times in
antitrust law and in other fields.7  With a “subjective intent” requirement,
the plaintiff must produce evidence that directly reveals the particular
defendant’s state of mind.  We use specific intent here to describe an inquiry
conducted on the basis of objective evidence, respecting the necessary
consequences of actions.  Rather than asking for direct evidence of what the
defendant had in mind, the objective approach asks what can be inferred as a
state of mind reasonably attributable to defendant in light of his conduct.
Our framework implies that this objective specific intent standard, which
generally is used in Section 2 cases, is the proper standard under Section 2.
We examine the Microsoft case8 under the lense of our framework, as a
concrete study of the function of intent rules in antitrust.  Some scholars
have argued that in high technology markets, where consumers face
substantial costs in switching from a dominant product standard, courts
should focus solely on the effects of the dominant firm’s conduct, weighing
in each case consumer benefits against competitive harms.9  They reason
that benign intent should not excuse firms in high technology markets,
where “network effects” (additional market power that results because
consumers are locked in to the dominant product) amplify barriers to
competition.10  Others have suggested that subjective intent evidence is
especially relevant in this setting, and can be used to support liability for
what might otherwise seem benign activity, again because of concern over
heightened barriers to competition.11  We reject both of these claims.  We
conclude that the existence of network effects tilts the case further in favor
of the specific intent requirement, properly understood as an objective
inquiry.
The error cost approach to legal standards also illuminates the reason that
intent standards are used in tort law, criminal law, constitutional law, and
elsewhere.  Economic analyses of law have tended to ignore intent
7 In criminal law, for example, “specific intent” typically refers to what we call “subjective
intent.”  See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, §10.04  at 105-06
(New York: Irwin, 2d ed. 1995); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
§ 3.5 at 216-227 (St. Paul: West Pub., 2d ed. 1986).
8 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 77,261 (D.D.C. 1998); see
also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  For the Findings of
Fact, see No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. 1998) (issued Nov. 5, 1999),
<www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f3800/msjudgex.htm>.
9 See Salop & Romaine, supra note 3, 651-665.
10 On the theory of network effects, see discussion infra IV.A.
11 E.g., Fisher Cross, supra note 2.
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doctrines, focusing on rules framed in terms of the actor’s conduct.12  Our
framework extends the economic analysis of legal rules by providing a
theory of the function of intent doctrines generally.  So far as courts are free
to tailor intent standards, they gravitate toward standards that minimize the
expected cost of legal errors.  While we do not argue that judge-made law
invariably advances social welfare,13 we do find that judicially-crafted legal
standards respecting intent generally coincide with this objective.
Part II below sets out a framework for legal rules that defines and
distinguishes “conduct” and “intent” standards, and applies that framework
to show how the key doctrinal rules in antitrust can be broken down into
conduct- and intent-based components.  Part III develops the error-cost
analysis of legal rules and uses it to provide a positive theory of intent
standards in the common law.  In the latter portion of Part III, we apply our
theory of intent standards to antitrust law.  Part IV applies the error cost
framework developed in Part III to the issues generated by the Microsoft
litigation.  Part V extends our theory of intent standards to explain
functionally similar rules in corporate, tort, and constitutional law.
II. Legal Standards in Antitrust Law
A. A Typology of Legal Standards
A legal standard sets forth the facts or conditions that must be proven or
implied by the evidence for the plaintiff to win his case.  Legal standards—
or more accurately, components of such standards—can be separated into
two categories.
One general type of legal standard, the conduct standard, describes the
sort of conduct that must be demonstrated for the plaintiff to prevail.  The
best-known conduct standard in antitrust law is the rule of reason (or
reasonableness) test, which requires proof that the competitive harms from
the defendant’s conduct outweigh any purported benefits to consumers from
that conduct.  The reasonableness test in antitrust law, like the negligence
12 See discussion infra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing failure to separate “specific
intent” torts, such as assault, from intentional torts in the standard economic analysis of tort
law).
13 See John Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 393 (1978); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as
a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Paul Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
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test in tort law, rests on a balancing of the social costs and benefits of the
defendant’s actions.14
The other major conduct standard observed in antitrust law, the per se
rule, does not ask decision-makers to evaluate the balance of social costs
and benefits.15  Thus, under the rule of per se illegality for price-fixing, the
defendant who participates in a cartel will be found in violation of the
Sherman Act whether or not his conduct could be deemed reasonable.16
The second type of legal standard, an intent standard, determines liability
in part by evidence concerning the defendant’s state of mind.  There are two
intent standards in antitrust.  Some claims require proof merely of the intent
to carry out the conduct set forth in the complaint; these claims fall under a
general intent standard.  These claims require only that the defendant know
that he is taking a particular action, not that he does so with the purpose of
bringing about a particular (undesirable) result.17  Other claims fall under a
specific intent standard, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
intended to harm competition. As discussed below, intent standards in
antitrust are part of a larger group of intent standards in the law.18
14 One question is whether the proper objective is the maximization of consumer welfare or
total welfare (the sum of consumer and producer welfare).  The two come into conflict in the
case of a “welfare tradeoff,” such as the case of a merger that reduces productions costs and at
the same time generates sufficient market power for the merged firm to raise its price.  A
consumer welfare objective would hold all such cases undesirable.  A total welfare standard
might approve such a merger, provided the efficiency gains outweigh the net loss in consumer
welfare.  For the case for using the total welfare standard in merger analysis, see Oliver E.
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV.
18 (1968).  Different constructions of the normative goal for antitrust can be important in
many contexts.  See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency,
Consumer Welfare and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020 (1987).  For the
most part, however, our intent analysis is unaffected by the specific antitrust maximand.
15 Courts have argued, in some cases, that this task (of balancing costs and benefits) has been
performed already in framing the per se rule.  For example, in United States v. Trenton
Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927), the Supreme Court suggested that the burdens of weighing the
costs and benefits of price-fixing on a case-by-case basis were too high given that price-fixing
is socially harmful in most cases, and thus a per se prohibition is justified.
16 E.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) (“[U]niform price-fixing
by those controlling in any substantial manner a trade or business in interstate commerce is
prohibited by the Sherman Law, despite the reasonableness of the particular prices agreed
upon . . .”)
17 In some instances, a mistake of fact can preclude formation of the general intent necessary
to criminal or civil liability.  The intent needed for liability, however, is not eliminated by all
mistaken beliefs.  On the meaning of general intent in the criminal law, see, e.g., DRESSLER,
supra note 7, §10.06 at 118-120; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 7, §3.5(e) at 223-225.
18 In Parts III and V we discuss intent standards and functionally similar rules in several other
areas of the law.  The general intent standard is similar to a standard that action be volitional
in many areas of law.  It can, however, impose serious burdens on antitrust plaintiffs,
depending on the nature of the conduct to which it applies. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
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Legal standards in antitrust and the common law generally should be
viewed as combinations of conduct and intent standards.  Consider again the
per se rule, making those who engage in price-fixing conspiracies  liable for
violating the Sherman Act whether or not they can prove that their actions
were economically reasonable.  The per se rule is a combination of a per se
conduct standard, since reasonableness of conduct is irrelevant under it, and
an intent standard that requires proof only of general intent—that is, the
intent to take part in a conspiracy.19
This typology of legal standards corresponds to the tests observed in the
common law.  Consider three examples from tort law: the negligence rule,
the legal standard for trespass, and the cause of action for assault.  The
negligence rule includes a conduct standard that requires proof that the
defendant’s conduct is unreasonable—that is, the cost of avoiding
foreseeable harm is less than the expected harm.20  Since there is no need to
prove specific intent to win a negligence suit, negligence requires no more
than evidence indicating general intent.21  Trespass doctrine is similar to
negligence in its intent component but not in its conduct component—it
does not require proof of unreasonable conduct or of a particular state of
mind with respect to purpose or consequences, only proof that the defendant
intended his conduct.22  In this sense, the trespass rule is a combination of a
The specific intent standard stands in place of a series of differentiated standards in other
areas.  Criminal law, for example, contains specific intent requirements that include the
intention to bring about particular harmful consequences, the knowledge that an action almost
certainly will have particular harmful consequences, and reckless disregard for the prospect
that an action will have such harmful consequences.  See generally, DRESSLER, supra note 7,
§10.04 at 105-116.
19 The intent standard here is general rather than specific because what is required is simply
the intent to engage in the conduct that violates the law, not to engage in that conduct for a
particular reason or with particular knowledge (e.g., to harm the victim). In conspiracy law,
the conduct is, of course, agreement to do something.  Agreement requires a certain mental
state with respect to completion of the agreed conduct—an expectation on at least one party’s
part that they will bring about the agreed conduct.  This does not, however, make the
necessary intent required here a specific, rather than a general, intent.  See discussion infra,
note 38.
20 The negligence standard holds the defendant liable if he fails to take care when the burden
of taking care is less than the expected incremental losses.  This standard is often referred to
as the Hand formula, since Judge Learned Hand was the first to state it explicitly in a court
opinion.  See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947).
21  Negligence will not be found if an action is not volitional.  So, for example, someone who
injures another during an epileptic seizure will not be liable in negligence for the injuries
unless, knowing of his condition, he voluntarily put himself in a position where the injuries
were likely to occur.  See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 29 at 162 (W.
Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen eds., St. Paul: West Pub.,
5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
22  Id., § 13 at 73.
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strict (or per se) liability rule and a general intent standard.23  The legal
standard for assault provides an example of a rule combining a reasonable
conduct standard and a specific intent requirement.  In an assault action, the
plaintiff presents evidence indicating unreasonable conduct (the assault) and
specific intent to cause harm.24
Although this framework suggests as many as four potential legal
standards (see figure 1), we see only three in antitrust and the common law
generally: strict or per se liability coupled with general intent,
reasonableness coupled with general intent, and reasonableness coupled
with specific intent.  The per se rule of antitrust and the trespass doctrine of
tort law are legal standards that combine a per se conduct rule with a general
intent standard.  In both cases, courts refuse to inquire into the
reasonableness of conduct, and there is no requirement to present evidence
indicating specific intent to harm.  The negligence rule in tort law and the
rule of reason test in antitrust both combine a reasonable conduct test with a
general intent standard.  The standard governing liability for assault (and
also that for punitive damages)25 is a reasonable conduct test combined with
a specific intent standard.  The missing standard—combining per se liability
with specific intent respecting the conduct at the core of the action—is an
unlikely combination because it would declare conduct punishable without
any consideration of offsetting benefits, but then resist liability unless the
defendant engaged in the conduct with a particular purpose or intended
consequence.26
23 A reasonable mistake—a belief that you were walking on your own property or on property
belonging to someone who had consented to your presence—will not defeat liability for
trespass.  However, absence of any intent to take the actions necessary to trespass—as with
sleep-walking—would preclude the requisite general intent.  PROSSER & KEETON supra note
21, §13 at 73.
24 THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1977) defines liability for assault as follows:
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for assault if (a) he acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent
apprehension.  Assault can be established without intent to harm, but recovery for such
technical or innocent assaults is limited to nominal damages. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 21, § 10 at 43.
25 See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, § 2 at 9-10 (discussing specific intent
requirement for punitive damages).  The intent requirement for punitive damages is not
limited to actual subjective intent to harm, encompassing as well evidence consistent with
knowledge of likely harm or reckless indifference to its likelihood.  We return below to the
explanation of specific intent as a basis for increased penalties, see discussion infra note 121.
26 We recognize, of course, that reasonable conduct can fall within the ambit of a per se rule.
Obviously, that is the critical distinction between a per se rule and a rule of reason.  But per se
rules do not burden classes of conduct viewed as reasonable in the main.  In that light,
consider the decision that a shipowner in distress is liable for trespass to the dock owner
whose property provides needed refuge. Even though seeking refuge in a storm is reasonable,
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Strict
Conduct Test
General
Intent
Negligence test
Rule of reason
Trespass rule
Price-fixing rule
Specific
Intent
Assault rule
Punitive damages rule
Figure 1
Although a specific intent to cause harm increases the likelihood of harm,
and is associated with a lower social value for the harmful act,27 this does
not imply a need for evidence on an individual’s subjective intent.  Under
traditional tort doctrines, even where specific intent is a necessary element,
it typically is inferred from evidence that does not purport directly to show
an actor’s state of mind.  Without any testimony about what a defendant said
he intended, courts routinely infer the specific intent to produce harmful
consequences in settings where the probable harms are substantial and
highly foreseeable while the cost of harm avoidance is small.28
To be sure, in some areas the common law does look at subjective
evidence of intent.  For example, criminal law sanctions often turn on such
evidence—did the defendant, Henry, in fact intend to kill George or merely
to frighten George when Henry fired the gun in George’s direction?
Without evidence of Henry’s actual state of mind, we cannot be certain of
the class of activity that encompasses it—making use of the property of another person when
you think it appropriate rather than when the owner has consented—is not.  See Vincent v.
Lake Erie Transportation, 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
27 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COL. L. REV. 1193,
1196-97 (1985) (destructive acts and coercive wealth transfers are undesirable because they
create social costs that are not offset by social benefits).
28 See, e.g., Allen v. Hannaford, 244 P. 700 (Wash. 1926) (despite defendant’s claim that gun
was unloaded, and she therefore could not have had an intent to harm, court found defendant
liable for assault); see generally, PROSSER & KEETON, supra note , § 10 at 46 (discussing
intent requirement for assault, noting that it is sufficient that defendant’s conduct intentionally
produces an apprehension of immediate harm).  Though the statement in the text suggests
negligence—and an injury under the circumstances described surely would be negligence—
courts often take the further step of inferring specific intent to harm in cases that can be
characterized as involving extreme or “gross” negligence.
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the character of Henry’s action or of the dangers to be expected of Henry.29
But this explanation only goes half way to justifying the use of subjective
intent evidence; for in addition to knowing what such evidence adds to our
evaluation of conduct, we also need to know the costs of obtaining and using
it.30  For now, it is enough to note that the costs and benefits associated with
subjective intent evidence vary depending on the area of law and to a degree
that legal standards eschew primary reliance on it.  Indeed, the absence of a
fourth cell in figure 1 suggests that intent analysis, objective or subjective, -
plays a largely subsidiary role in the common law.
The final piece of the legal standards puzzle is the selection of standards
of proof.  The legal standard itself sets forth facts or conditions that must be
proven, while the standard of proof establishes the degree of certainty that
must be established to satisfy a decision-maker that the legal standard is
met.  A preponderance of the evidence standard, for example, requires the
plaintiff to show that it is more probable than not that the defendant violated
the legal standard.  It follows from this that the “effective legal standard”
can be thought of as the product of the conduct standard, the intent standard,
and the standard of proof.  The most stringent legal standard (unreasonable
conduct combined with specific intent) coupled with the highest proof
burden (beyond a reasonable doubt) puts the highest effective legal burden
on the shoulders of the plaintiff.  Our analysis below is an attempt to
understand the legal standards in antitrust, but it will have implications for
standards outside of antitrust and the allocation of proof burdens as well.
29 On the role of intent in the punishment of attempts, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 115-22 (Boston: Little, Brown 1978); Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal
Liability: Decriminalizing Harmless Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L. J. 1057 (1992).  The
“subjectivist” theory that the defendant’s intent is the controlling factor in the punishment of
attempts (and offensive conduct generally) is attributed to John Austin, see 1 JOHN AUSTIN,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 523 (London: J. Murray, 4th ed. 1873).  The explanation in text
is phrased in terms of deterrence (or some other consequentialist end) as the goal for criminal
law.  That explanation fits our own priors as well as the contours of the law, but it is by no
means essential to the requirement of subjective intent evidence in settings such as this.
Jurists and commentators who embrace retributive or other nonconsequentialist goals also
find state-of-mind evidence essential to gauge appropriate punishment in settings where the
level of risk is ambiguous.  Indeed, retributivist theorists, from Austin forward, have been the
most vocal proponents of the subjectivist approach to punishment.  For a recent statement of
the retributivist view, see Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994).
30 We address these issues below, see discussion infra part III.A.
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B. Section 1 Legal Standards
Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Standard Oil,31
it has been clear that the reasonableness standard applies as the default
conduct rule in Section 1 cases.  Courts generally have not focused
separately on the intent standard for Section 1 cases.  But, even without
isolating that aspect of the legal standard for Section 1 liability, courts have
made the default standard for intent in these cases fairly clear.
In the first Supreme Court case specifically to address the intent issue,
Nash v. United States,32 the Court rejected the claim that proof of a specific
intent to restrain trade or to harm competition was required before a
defendant could be found to have violated the Sherman Act.  The defendant
in Nash argued that the rule of reason test (which had recently been adopted
by the Court in Standard Oil) was unconstitutionally vague as a criminal
standard because no one could know with certainty what a court would
conclude constituted reasonable conduct.33  One possible route to cure that
alleged failing would have been to require a specific intent to violate the
law, a route taken by the Court to cure vagueness problems with other
statutes.34  The Court, through Justice Holmes, rejected this approach,
declaring that the vagueness problem was of little concern as the law is “full
of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . some
matter of degree.”35  Perhaps that is why Holmes’ opinion in Nash was
31 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
32 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
33 Id., at 376.
34 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).  The Court also later read a specific
intent requirement into the Sherman Act for criminal liability, United States v. Gypsum, 438
U.S. 422 (1978).  Nash, however, continues to define the standard for application of antitrust
law in civil suits.
35 Nash, 229 U.S. at 377.  Holmes supported his assertion with a few examples:
“If a man should kill another by driving an automobile furiously into a crowd he might be
convicted of murder however little he expected the result. . . . If he did no more than drive
negligently through a street he might get off with manslaughter or less . . . And in the last case
he might be held although he himself thought that he was acting as a prudent man should.”
229 U.S. at 377.
Although the law now requires proof of specific intent in criminal antitrust actions (see
United States v. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422 (1978)), there was considerable merit in the
defendant’s position when Nash was decided.  The rule of reason standard in antitrust is
essentially a cost-benefit test, like the negligence standard in tort law.  Courts have had no
trouble accepting the position that a defendant can be civilly liable for negligence while
failing to have the level of intent required under the criminal law.  In other words, it is
understood that fair-minded individuals—those who do not possess a criminal intent—may
decide wrongly and fail to do what a reasonable person would do.  Violation of a criminal
standard traditionally requires a specific intent to cause a particular harm.
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characteristically brief and uncharacteristically unpersuasive.  Holmes did
not have an easy task in justifying the reasonableness standard along with a
general intent standard as a basis for criminal conduct.  Section 1 is the
result of Congress’s effort to criminalize conduct that traditionally had been
dealt with under contract law—specifically, the law governing contracts in
restraint of trade.   The standard approach in that common law restraint of
trade doctrine was a reasonableness standard combined with a general intent
standard.   (On the common law of trade restraints, see, e.g., DONALD
DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 123-38 (Chicago: Rand-
McNally 1959).) Applying that legal standard in a criminal statute, however,
necessarily raised notice and vagueness issues.  However, none of the
available alternatives would have adhered to Congress’ direction, made
sense, and avoided questions about overreaching under the criminal law.
While the Standard Oil and Nash decisions made the rule of reason the
default legal standard—with reasonableness as the default conduct rule and
general intent as the default intent rule—under Section 1, the Supreme Court
identified a class of price-fixing cases as exceptional.  Much of the case law
over the past seventy-five years has focused on locating the boundaries
between the reasonable and per se conduct rules and between the cases
where general intent will suffice and those where a specific intent is
required.
Direct Price-fixing
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., the Supreme Court held that an
agreement to fix prices is per se illegal.36  Under the rule laid down in
Socony, price-fixing is illegal even if the defendants do not have the power
to carry out their price-fixing conspiracy.37  The level of intent that must be
shown under this rule corresponds to the general intent requirement of tort
36 310 U.S. 150 (1940).  Under Socony, the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving that
the defendants’ conduct was unreasonable on economic grounds—nor, for that matter, can the
defendant evade liability by showing that his conduct was economically reasonable.  310
U.S., at 213-14.  For example, the defendant cannot evade liability by proving that a price-
fixing conspiracy was necessary in order to avoid “ruinous competition”, a claim advanced by
railroads in some of the earliest antitrust cases. 310 U.S. at 220-21.  For a sophisticated
economic treatment of the “ruinous competition” argument, see LESTER G. TELSER, A THEORY
OF EFFICIENT COOPERATION (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1987); George
Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe
Case, 25 J. LAW & ECON. 201 (1982); George Bittlingmayer, Price-Fixing and the Addyston
Pipe Case, 5 RES. L. & ECON. 57 (1983); Mark F. Grady, Toward a Positive Economic
Theory of Antitrust, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 225 (1992).
37 See Socony, 310 U.S. at 224-26, n.59.  This should be understood as an application of
traditional conspiracy doctrine.
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law: an intent simply to perform the conduct that violates the law, not to
inflict some particular harm.  Thus, what plaintiffs must show is evidence
that defendants intended to make and carry out a price-fixing plan, not
necessarily to make monopoly profits from price-fixing or to achieve some
other purpose.38  Even if the defendants comprised too small a share of the
market to have a significant impact on the market price, and therefore could
not rationally have thought they were going to make monopoly profits, they
still may be found guilty of conspiracy under Section 1.39  Even if the
defendants’ motives were demonstrably benign, they may be found in
violation of Section 1.40
Like the intent standard for trespass in tort law, the intent component of
the per se rule in antitrust requires only an intention to carry out the conduct
charged in the complaint.  As under trespass, the plaintiff need not show that
the defendant intended to cause harm or to gain in any particular way.
Trespass doctrine permits a defendant to avoid liability if he can show that
his conduct was not voluntary, as in the case of someone thrown off of his
horse on to the plaintiff’s property.  However, it is difficult to see how the
involuntary-conduct defense could be applied in the Section 1 context.
While participants in a price-fixing conspiracy need not have the power to
carry out their scheme, each participant will have made a conscious decision
to take part in the venture.
Although proof of conduct and general intent generally will carry the
plaintiff’s burden in a Section 1 case, those elements will not always be
sufficient.  The Court has created two exceptions to the per se rule against
price fixing, one explicit and the other implicit.  The explicit exception is
that of Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (BMI),
which requires application of the reasonable conduct test in a case where the
price-fixing agreement is essential for the introduction of a new product.41
The implicit exception is that of Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
38 This example shows how the line between specific and general intent—and between
general intent and no intent—changes with variation in the conduct defined by the law.
Price-fixing requires an agreement to fix prices, so a knowledge that there is agreement and
that the agreement is to fix prices constitutes the general intent with respect to this allegation.
39 For example, the defendants in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S.
377 (1921) represented roughly one third of the hardwood market.  They were found guilty of
violating Section 1.  However, it is unlikely that the defendants could have had a substantial
influence on the market price of hardwood, given a market share of only one third.  See, e.g.,
DONALD DEWEY, supra note 35, at 168.
40 For example, the defendants in Socony claimed that they were trying to continue their
compliance with the NIRA fair competition codes, even though the statute had been declared
unconstitutional. See Socony, 310 U.S., at 241.
41 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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Inc.,42 which requires application of the reasonable conduct test when the
defendant restricts intra-brand competition in order to enhance inter-brand
competition.43  These exceptions create two points at which the per se
conduct test yields to permit a reasonableness defense—though at both
points the general intent standard remains.
Indirect Price-Fixing: Parallel Behavior and Facilitating Practices
Not all price-fixing fits the classic model of agreement in a smoke-filled
room.  In other cases, plaintiffs may find it extraordinarily difficult to prove
that the parties intended to participate in a price-fixing plan.  Some
commentators have urged that such cases be judged by a different standard
than applies generally to price-fixing, eliminating the requirement that a
plaintiff prove intent.44  By and large, however, courts have not followed
that approach.
Perhaps the most important category of these cases are those involving
“conscious parallelism,” where one observes parallel pricing or output
decisions by a group of competitors.  For example, consider the case of
several airlines simultaneously raising their prices on flights between
California and New York.  Although the legal standard was unclear before
1950, the modern cases state that the plaintiff generally must prove
conspiracy.45  The prevailing legal rule retains the general intent standard,
imposing a burden on plaintiffs to show that the parties’ actions provide
clear evidence that they intended to fix prices through their agreement.
Since showing similar or even identical prices is not necessarily enough to
42 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
43 Sylvania dealt with territorial restraints in a vertical relationship.  The Court has never
clearly said that the Sylvania defense applies to the horizontal setting, creating an explicit
exception to the per se rule.  However, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Court referred to the Sylvania defense as a justification
for applying the rule of reason test.  NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103.
44 This is the key implication of Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A
Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).  Posner argued that Section 1 of the
Sherman Act should be interpreted in a manner that permits courts to find defendants guilty of
price-fixing on the basis of circumstantial evidence with respect to agreement and intent.
Well before Posner’s influential article, Eugene Rostow argued for more aggressive reliance
on circumstantial evidence in Section 1 cases.  See Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman
Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (1947).
45 See, e.g., Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 n.21
(1986) (“Conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy
does not, without more, support even an inference of conspiracy.”) Of course, the plaintiff can
still rely on circumstantial evidence.  However, the circumstantial evidence must be of a sort
that “tends to exclude the possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted independently.
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
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discharge that burden,46 the general  intent standard here can provide a real
stumbling block to success.
A similar problem arises in cases involving “facilitating practices;”
information sharing arrangements that could be used to support a price-
fixing conspiracy, such as agreements to share information on bids from
customers or information on production and marketing costs.  Although the
issue in these cases has been referred to as one of choosing between a per se
or rule of reason standard,47 the rule in these cases, as in other price-fixing
cases, is that any agreement to fix prices is presumptively unlawful—that is
the per se rule for conduct coupled with the general intent standard.
The key issue in facilitating practices cases is not what conduct standard
to apply but, rather, what counts as proof of intent and agreement to fix
prices.  Since a decision to share information could be strong or weak
evidence that parties agreed to fix prices, the Court generally has required
additional evidence of an intent to fix prices, separate from proof of the
intent to share information or to engage in other challenged practices.48  But
in cases where the risk of the challenged practice developing into full-blown
price fixing is especially high—where there is an oligopolistic market with
relatively inelastic demand and the firms share information on current
prices—the Court has inferred the necessary (general) intent from the
evidence of conduct.49
Trade Restraints Generally
In addition to price-fixing through direct and indirect means, the Section 1
case law also deals with other concerted methods of restraining trade, such
as group boycotts.  These cases fall outside the per se rule that applies to
price-fixing, being governed by the default standards for Section 1.
Following Standard Oil and Nash, the general rule for Section 1 cases
combines a reasonableness standard for conduct with a general intent
standard.
46 Such pricing evidence is consistent with the possibility of an intent to fix prices, but in
many settings it will not be so obviously consistent with that conclusion to the exclusion of
other possible intentions as to prove that intent.  For example, basing-point pricing schemes
often result in identical prices (to several decimal places), yet it does not follow from this that
there is a conspiracy with respect to price.  See David D. Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing:
Competitive vs. Collusive Theories, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 289 (June 1982).
47 See, e.g, ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECNONOMICS
240-47 (West Pub. Co., 4th ed. 1994) (discussing legal standards applied to information
sharing arrangements).
48 Maple Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. United States 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
49 United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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Two categories of Section 1 case law are illustrative.  One concerns
conduct that affects processes for price setting, but that should not be
characterized as price fixing.  For example, National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States involved a rule promulgated by the professional
engineers’ society prohibiting members from bargaining over price before
accepting a contract.50  The Supreme Court found the restriction sufficiently
remote from a concerted effort to fix prices that it would not apply the per se
rule, opting for the reasonableness rule instead.51  Similarly, in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States,52 the Court characterized the Board’s “call
rule” as a restriction on the period of price-setting rather than the actual
prices.53  The other set of cases involves group boycotts.  In Northwest
Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,54 the Court
announced that the rule of reason test applies generally to boycotts, with a
possible exception for the case where the boycotting group has “market
power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective
competition.”55
C. Section 2 Legal Standards
The Supreme Court’s decision in Socony to apply the framework of
conspiracy doctrine to price-fixing essentially fixed the conduct and intent
standards at the core of Section 1.  Standard Oil declared the rule of reason
test as the default conduct rule for both Section 1 and Section 2 cases.
However, there has been less clear guidance in Section 2 cases.  The
specific meaning of the reasonableness test applied under Section 2 has
varied over time as Section 2 doctrine has developed,56 and the courts have
50 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
51 435 U.S., at 692.
52 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
53 246 U.S., at 239.
54 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
55 472 U.S., at 296.
56 One might think that application of the reasonableness test to Section 2 accounts for much
of the difference in doctrinal clarity between Section 1 and Section 2.  Typically a
reasonableness test gives less guidance to courts than a per se rule; some judgments that are
made through case-by-case application of a reasonableness standard commonly are
internalized in a per se rule.  See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 12-14, 93-
100, 137-45 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press 1991).  This does not make one or the other
necessarily a better rule, though it will give the per se test a more “rule-like” quality.
Judgments respecting what is and is not reasonable will differ across time, circumstances, and
decision-makers.  However, even if we limit our focus to only those cases subject to the
reasonableness test, both under Section 1 and  under Section 2, it remains the case, as we
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not provided clear, explicit direction on the intent standard in Section 2.  In
spite of this, the case law does reveal the contours of the intent standard
courts have been using under Section 2.
Reasonableness and Alcoa
Any discussion of the legal standard under Section 2 must take Alcoa as the
starting point, as Judge Hand’s Alcoa opinion sought both to clarify and
modify the legal rule of Section 2.57  In an opinion that set the course for the
modern legal standard under Section 2, Judge Learned Hand held that Alcoa
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by its aggressive efforts to expand
capacity, which had the effect of deterring entry by potential rivals.  Under
Hand’s Alcoa doctrine, the operative conduct test under Section 2 is a
reasonableness test that holds a defendant liable if the plaintiff establishes
that the defendant has monopoly power in the market at issue, has engaged
in conduct that has an exclusionary effect, and that the exclusion of others
cannot be attributed to the defendant’s good luck or superior skill, foresight,
and industry.  Translated into the terms of economists, the Alcoa doctrine
requires monopoly power and proof that the anticompetitive harms of
defendant’s conduct outweigh its consumer benefits.  The associated intent
rule under Alcoa is a general intent test.  Judge Hand did not think a specific
hope to make clear in this part, that the Section 2 reasonableness test has evolved in a less
direct, linear fashion than the Section 1 test.
57 Before the Alcoa decision, the conduct standard under Section 2 was the abuse formula
announced in Standard Oil.  The abuse standard condemned conduct that would have
violated Section 1 if engaged in by a group of firms.  Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55 (“[H]aving
by the first section forbidden all means of monopolizing trade . . . the second section seeks, if
possible, to make the prohibitions of the act all the more complete and perfect by embracing
all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section, . . . , even although the acts by
which such results are attempted to be brought about or are brought about be not embraced
within the general enumeration of the first section.”)  The abuse standard suggests that a
monopolist violates Section 2 when he refuses to deal with a customer or supplier in a setting
where such conduct would have the effect of foreclosing that customer or supplier from the
market.   For example, the monopolist newspaper in Lorain Journal, which was found in
violation of Section 2 for refusing to deal with advertisers who gave business to a new,
fledgling radio station, presumably would have violated the abuse standard.  The Court failed
to provide a clear statement of the associated intent requirement; however, the cases suggest
that proof of specific intent was required.  For example, in Standard Oil, the Court referred to
the defendant’s acquisitions as giving rise to the “prima facie presumption of intent and
purpose to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry, not as a result of normal methods of
industrial development, but by new means of combination . . .”  221 U.S., at 75.
 18 ANTITRUST INTENT [JULY]
intent to stifle competition was required, because “no monopolist
monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.”58
There has been some debate over the appropriate characterization of the
rule announced by Judge Hand.  For example, Steven Salop and Craig
Romaine have suggested that Alcoa announces a per se rule that applies to
any exclusionary conduct by a firm with monopoly power.59  This may be a
fair description of the full implication of the Alcoa decision, since Judge
Hand gave short shrift to Alcoa’s efficiency arguments.  However, if we
take the Alcoa decision at face value, it is apparently announcing a
reasonable conduct standard, not a per se standard:
It does not follow because ‘Alcoa’ had such a monopoly, that it
“monopolized” the ingot market: it may not have achieved monopoly;
monopoly may have been thrust upon it. . . . Since the Act makes
“monopolizing” a crime, as well as a civil wrong, it would be not only unfair,
but presumably contrary to the intent of Congress, to include such instances.  A
market may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible to produce at all
and meet the cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply the
whole demand.  Or there may be changes in taste or in cost which drive out all
but one purveyor.  A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of
active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight, and
industry.  In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although the result
may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to
condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster:
finis opus coronat.  The successful competitor, having been urged to compete,
must not be turned upon when he wins.60
The Section 2 case law built on Alcoa’s foundation reflects this
reasonableness approach, not the per se test Salop and Romaine would
extract from Judge Hand’s opinion.  Moreover, the reasonable conduct
standard adopted in Alcoa has survived into the existing Section 2 case
law.61  The common starting place for judicial analysis of monopolization
claims under Section 2—the formulation given in United States v. Grinnell
58 Alcoa, 148 F.2d, at 432.  Soon after the Alcoa decision, the Court in United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948), said that specific intent need not be proven in a
monopolization case, provided there is evidence of success on the defendant’s part.
59 Salop & Romaine, supra note 3, at 650.
60 148 F. 2d, at 430-31.
61 Our colleague, Joe Brodley, cautions that it is a mistake to take Hand’s language in Alcoa
at face value – especially his treatment of the efficiency issue – without recalling the
durability of the monopoly at issue. This caution reinforces our understanding of Alcoa as
applying a reasonableness test and also explains Alcoa’s subsequent treatment by other
courts.
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Corp.62—incorporates Alcoa by requiring proof of (1) monopoly power and
(2) acquisition or maintenance of that power through means other than
superior skill, foresight, and industry.  The conduct, thus, must differ from
ordinary competitive actions that might result in monopoly power.
Specific Intent in Section 2
The significant change in the legal rule since Alcoa is not its construction as
a reasonable conduct standard but the inclusion of a specific intent
component.  The current Section 2 law suggests the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant acted solely or primarily out of intent to gain or maintain
monopoly power.  As we noted earlier, courts have not routinely
decomposed the legal test into a conduct component and an intent
component.  Thus, the requirement that the plaintiff must prove specific
intent has to be understood as an inference drawn from the language and the
holdings of the modern Section 2 cases.
Paradoxically, the Supreme Court’s decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp.63—a decision roundly criticized for suggesting an
extremely plaintiff-friendly conduct standard64—provides perhaps the best
evidence of the specific intent requirement implied in the modern Section 2
cases.  To understand the Court’s decision in Aspen Skiing, it is critical to
keep sight of the procedural posture of the case.  A jury had concluded that
Aspen Skiing’s decision to discontinue a joint marketing arrangement with
its weaker competitor (Aspen Highlands) was motivated solely by its desire
to “discourage its customers from doing business with its smaller rival.”65
The Supreme Court rejected Aspen Skiing’s appeal because the company
failed to present credible evidence that its actions were motivated by any
pro-consumer or efficiency concerns.  The only justifications offered by
Aspen Skiing for its refusal to deal with its competitor were (i) the difficulty
of monitoring the accuracy of the method used for allocating revenue
between Aspen Skiing and Aspen Highlands and (ii) its desire to
62 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
63 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
64 See, e.g., Alon Y. Kapen, Note, Duty to Cooperate under Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
Aspen Skiing’s Slippery Slope, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1047 (1987); David M. Rievman, Note,
The Grinnell Test of Monopolization Sounds a False Alarm: Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 28 B.C.L. REV. 415 (1987).  In Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F. 2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986), Judge Posner treated the Aspen
Skiing doctrine as largely limited to the facts of that case.  Id., at 379 (“If [ Aspen Skiing]
stands for any principle that goes beyond its unusual facts, it is that a monopolist may be
guilty of monopolization if it refuses to cooperate with a competitor in circumstances where
some cooperation is indispensable to effective competition.”).
65 Id., at 610.
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disassociate itself from the inferior services of its rival.  However, both of
these justifications were inconsistent with the evidence and with Aspen
Skiing’s own behavior in other markets.  In other words, the Supreme Court
held that Aspen Skiing had violated Section 2 because the evidence
indicated that it had a specific intent to monopolize.
The Court’s approval of a specific intent requirement in Aspen Skiing is
especially evident when its decision is read together with the lower court’s
jury instruction:
In considering whether the means or purposes were anti-competitive or
exclusionary, you must draw a distinction here between practices which tend to
exclude or restrict competition on the one hand and the success of a business
which reflects only a superior product, a well-run business, or luck, on the
other. . . .
[A] company which possesses monopoly power and which refuses to enter
into a joint operating agreement with a competitor or otherwise refuses to deal
with a competitor in some manner does not violate Section 2 if valid business
reasons exist for that refusal. . . .
We are concerned with conduct which unnecessarily excludes or handicaps
competitors.  This is conduct which does not benefit consumers by making a
better product or service available—or in other ways—and instead has the
effect of impairing competition.66
This instruction is quoted approvingly in the Court’s opinion.67  Although
the first quoted paragraph of the instruction seems to allow bad motives to
substitute for bad conduct, the second paragraph makes clear that good
motives will exculpate.  Together, the instruction seems to make specific
intent to monopolize an element of Section 2.  If the Court had wanted to
signal its preference for a different intent standard under Section 2, the jury
instruction in Aspen Skiing provided a perfect opportunity.  The Court’s
decision to forgo this opportunity—after quoting the jury instruction in
full—suggests that the general intent rule of Alcoa and its immediate
progeny is no longer the operative intent standard under Section 2.
Specific Intent versus Subjective Intent under Section 2
While the Supreme Court seems to have read the law as imposing a specific
intent requirement, it apparently has not taken the further step of imposing a
subjective intent requirement, one that rests on evidence purporting directly
to describe the defendant’s intent.  Subjective intent standards in antitrust
66 Id., at 596-97 (emphasis supplied).
67 Id.
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would move beyond making inferences about intent from evidence of the
actions taken by firms.  The obvious source of additional evidence would be
statements from defendants about the impact a given action would have on
the competitive environment faced by the firm.
The problem with subjective intent evidence in this context is two-fold.
First, it is difficult to obtain reliable evidence of subjective intent for a
firm’s business practices.  The problem is not the well-understood point that
entities such as corporations, as distinct from individuals, cannot form an
intent.68  Although that point is true for firms as it is for all groups, it is still
useful to treat a group activity as purposive in many settings.69  The
problem, rather, is that in pursuit of that end, the comments made by
individuals within a firm can be misleading if taken at face value as
evidence of corporate intent, given the common practice of speaking in the
language of war or of sports contests.70
Second, subjective intent evidence is often of relatively modest value.
Where there is a real intent to do something illegal, well-advised firms are
unlikely to provide much in the way of helpful evidence.  Lawyers will
routinely advise clients not to leave in their files any memoranda or
statements suggesting a desire to eliminate competitors.71  If antitrust
plaintiffs were required to prove subjective intent through reference to
statements that provided clear evidence of it, it would be the extraordinary
case where any firm would retain “smoking gun” memoranda in their files.72
68 See, e.g., Kenneth Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymo-
ron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1991).
69 A similar understanding is integral to Lon Fuller’s approach to legal interpretation.  See
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1969).
However, our point here can be illustrated by a simple example.  Each member of a football
team may have a different set of goals.  One may want to be traded from his current team;
others may be focused on attaining particular individual records.  All of the players together,
however, can be seen as sharing a purpose of winning.  Individual behavior may not be
perfectly congruent with this goal—largely because of the pull of other, divergent goals—but
this is the central, shared goal toward which the players as a group strive.  So too, despite the
different individual interests pulling in diverse directions it is reasonable to see the various
individuals in profit-seeking businesses as united in pursuit of making money.
70 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 190 (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976) (“Especially misleading here is the inveterate tendency of sales
executives to brag to their superiors about their competitive prowess, often using metaphors
of coercion that are compelling evidence of predatory intent to the naive.”).
71 E.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting
that under a predation test based on intent, knowledgeable firms would refrain from an “overt
description” of foreseeable anticompetitive consequences); A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre
Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (J. Easterbrook); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY §6.5a at 281 (St. Paul: West Pub. 1999).
72 Certainly, as every plaintiff will argue, such memoranda could be the residue of a firm
whose management is so oblivious to the wrongfulness of its intent to undermine market
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Perhaps in response to these problems, the Supreme Court has suggested
a preference for the objective approach to intent.  Consider again the Court’s
analysis in Aspen Skiing.  It is consistent with an objective approach to
determining specific intent.  Under an objective approach, the court infers
specific intent on the basis of evidence indicating the absence of credible
efficiency justifications for the monopolists’s conduct.  The Court
necessarily took this approach in Aspen Skiing because the plaintiffs had no
evidence of subjective intent.  The lower court decision was based entirely
on the defendant’s inability to provide a credible efficiency justification.
The Court’s decision in Eastman Kodak73 provides another perspective on
the specific intent requirement, one that permits us to approach the question
from a starting point diametrically opposed to that in Aspen Skiing.  In
Eastman Kodak, the Court refused to grant summary judgment on the
Section 2 claims, even though the Court acknowledged that “liability turns,
then, on whether valid business reasons can explain Kodak’s actions.”74
Eastman Kodak had several business reasons that could explain its actions,
and yet the Court refused to grant summary judgment in its favor.  One
could argue that Eastman Kodak undermines the specific intent requirement,
since the decision can be read as lowering the bar plaintiffs must clear to
show specific intent from the standard defined by the Supreme Court in
other Section 2 cases.75  But the Court’s disposition of the Section 2 claims
in Eastman Kodak is better seen as an effort to implement the specific intent
standard described in Aspen Skiing.  The decision in Eastman Kodak
recognizes that the test for specific intent cannot be whether any plausible
efficiency justification can be conceived; for if that were the test, defendants
almost never would lose.  Plausible efficiency justifications are, after all,
easy to generate.
The Court’s opinion in Eastman Kodak implies that credible efficiency
justifications—not those that are merely plausible—would suffice to defeat
a finding of specific intent to undermine competition.76  The plausible
operations that they never consider the possibility that honest declaration of their intent to
undermine competition would present legal problems.  But there is little reason to expect that
this would explain most cases. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 70, at 189-190 (discussing
ambiguity of subjective intent evidence); HOVENKAMP, supra note 71, at 281.
73 Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
74 Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
75 Indeed, in addition to the fact that Eastman Kodak seems to deviate from the objective
approach to specific intent implicit in earlier antitrust cases, the decision apparently weakens
intellectual property rights, some scholars have argued, by inviting an inquiry into the
subjective intent behind a refusal to license.  See David McGowan, Networks and Intention in
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 24 J. CORP. L. 485 (1999).
76 504 U.S. at 478-79.
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efficiency justification is one that could hold under hypothetical conditions;
the credible efficiency justification is one that seems likely to explain
actions under the actual conditions.  The Eastman Kodak decision fits the
credible efficiency justification approach to an objective, specific intent
standard.  Although Eastman Kodak’s efficiency justifications were
arguably plausible, the plaintiffs had raised sufficient doubt as to their
credibility to make summary disposition inappropriate under an objective,
specific intent standard.77
Eastman Kodak’s consistency with a specific intent requirement is
clarified when other cases, in addition to Aspen Skiing and Eastman Kodak
are examined.  For example, the specific intent requirement is a clear
implication of the Court’s analysis of predatory pricing doctrine since
Matsushita Electric Industries Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation.78
Matsushita, Brooke Group,79 and several important appellate court decisions
such as A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms80 and Barry Wright Corp. v.
ITT Grinnell Corp.81 indicate that plaintiffs must present evidence of a
specific intent to monopolize if they are to prevail in a predatory pricing
case.82  This is a direct implication of the “objective reasonableness”
standard adopted in Matsushita.  Under the Matsushita standard, a plaintiff
in a predatory pricing case must present evidence suggesting that his claim
is objectively reasonable in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment.  In the predatory pricing context, objective reasonableness
requires evidence that the defendant could reasonably expect to recoup its
losses from a predatory campaign.83
The recoupment test now firmly required under Section 2 doctrine is
another way of stating the requirement that a plaintiff provide objective
proof of a specific intent to undermine competition.  The recoupment test
demands that predatory pricing plaintiffs present evidence demonstrating
that the defendant’s price cuts would have been unprofitable if the price cuts
did not have the effect of eliminating or reducing competition and that there
was a reasonable basis to believe that defendant would be able to profit from
the price cuts by virtue of the elimination (or dramatic reduction) of
77 504 U.S. at 478-79.
78 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
79 Brooke Group v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
80 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989).
81 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
82 These cases, though consistent with this analysis, do not all address directly the nature of
the evidence required to sustain plaintiff’s burden on the intent issue.  However, as we argue
in the text, they construct an objective test for predation that effectively requires plaintiffs to
show that the defendant had a specific intent to monopolize.
83 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
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competition.84  Given such evidence, the proper inference is that the
defendant had a specific intent to monopolize or, equivalently, to create
effective barriers to competition.85  In other words, the recoupment test of
the modern predatory pricing case law effectively imposes a specific intent
standard on plaintiffs that must be met by objective evidence.
III. Justifying Legal Standards
The core of our analysis consists of conduct, intent, and proof standards.
Conduct standards typically come in one of two forms: per se (strict)
liability or a reasonableness rule.  Intent standards typically require either
general or specific intent.  Standards of proof usually require proof by a
preponderance of the evidence or beyond reasonable doubt.  The effective
legal standards existing in any area of the law can be viewed as
combinations of conduct, intent, and proof standards.
Generally the components of legal rules can be aligned along a continuum
and grouped in different combinations,86 but we have identified three rule
types that represent the most important categories for antitrust and common
law.  These are (1) per se liability combined with general intent, (2)
reasonable conduct combined with general intent, and (3) reasonable
conduct coupled with specific intent. We show in this section how the
selection of one or another of the rule types and proof standards—and
especially the selection of intent tests—responds to particular constellations
of the costs and benefits of information.  The framework we propose for
understanding the detailed structure of legal rules is error cost analysis.
A. Error Cost Analysis
84 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-589; Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224.
85 See Salop & Romaine, supra note 3, at 650 (discussing predatory pricing doctrine and
purpose inquiry).
86 Indeed, legal rules can be more or less flexible; they can give more or less “fixed”
instructions to decision-makers.  That is a commonplace, reflected in innumerable discussions
of the differences between rules and standards, or rules and principles.  See, e.g., RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28, 72-80 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1977);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 590-93 (New York: Aspen Law & Bus.,
5th ed. 1998); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 12-14, 93-100 (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press 1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976).  Professor Schauer in particular has emphasized that the
variation in flexibility-versus-fixity is far more a matter of timing and of personnel
assignments than of substantive decision—the variation primarily describes a choice between
what concerns are considered subsumed within a legal rule and what instead are identified as
matters to be weighed in its application.
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Much of the commentary that explores the shape of common law and
antitrust rules uses some form of deterrence analysis, asking how a legal rule
can be framed to deter socially undesirable conduct.87  Although
sophisticated deterrence analysis is sensitive to the social costs of alternative
rule designs,88 giving the central place in the analysis to deterrence is
potentially misleading, making it difficult to offer a theory of intent rules.
For example, the deterrence analysis used to explain the assignment of
strict liability and negligence standards in tort law is unlikely to provide a
good explanation of intent rules.89  Indeed, under the deterrence analysis
used to justify conduct rules in tort law, it would appear that general intent
should always be sufficient to hold the defendant liable.  The reason is
simple: if we are trying to deter bad conduct, it should make no difference to
us whether the defendant intended to carry out the act, or intended to hurt
someone.  As long as the defendant had a choice, and made a decision to act,
simple deterrence analysis suggests that he should face the liability
consequences of his act.90
In order to justify intent rules, and to explain the detailed structure of
legal rules generally, we should focus less on the deterrence question and
more on the operational properties and consequences of a conduct rule.
Beyond the incentive effects of a conduct standard, the balance struck in
crafting legal rules should attend to the social costs associated with rule
application.  Much of the structure of legal rules can be understood by
focusing on a rule component’s effect on expected error costs.  Our
87 For an example of such an approach in the torts context, see WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press 1987).
88 E.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (providing a
transaction-costs based theory of rule types).
89 Consider, for example, the analysis in LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87.  Because the core
of their framework is the Hand formula for negligence, they give scant attention in this work
to rules based on specific intent.  Thus, their chapter on intentional torts examines as a class
all torts involving intentional conduct (battery, assault, false imprisonment) in an economic
model that does not require separate analysis for those torts involving specific intent (e.g.,
assault).  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 149-89.  Indeed, before reaching their
discussion of remedies, Landes and Posner find little reason to distinguish intentional torts
from unintentional torts.  Id., at 159-60.  Our approach implicitly asserts that specific intent
rules are special in a sense that requires a different liability standard (not merely a different
remedy, such as punitive damages).  We aim in the text to provide a detailed justification for
the legal tests adopted for various “specific intent” violations.
90 For an early statement of this argument as a defense of the trespass rule, see OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. THE COMMON LAW 97 (Boston: Little, Brown 1881).
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hypothesis, broadly, is that intent standards, and proof standards as well, are
designed to minimize the expected error costs of a legal rule.
Error: Types and Costs
The easiest way to see the contribution of an intent standard to reducing
expected error costs is by reference to the ideal application of a conduct
standard.  Under a reasonableness standard, error occurs when a court deems
a defendant’s conduct reasonable even though it actually was unreasonable
(that is, the expected harms created by the defendant’s conduct outweigh
expected benefits).  Similarly, error occurs under the reasonableness test
when a court deems a defendant’s conduct unreasonable even though it was
in fact reasonable.  The first type of error we will call a false acquittal
(though obviously we are not focusing primarily on the application of
criminal laws) and the second type a false conviction.
Error rates can be thought of, first, as the inaccurate application of a
conduct standard, but error rates also can be thought of as deviation from an
ideal.  On that view, application of a per se or strict liability standard to a
type of conduct that is generally reasonable can be grouped with false
convictions—it will produce convictions (liability assessments) in a number
of instances where the defendant’s conduct was socially desirable.91
The expected error cost associated with a legal rule is the product of the
probability of error and the cost of error.  The cost of error can be attributed
to several sources.  Error can lead to underdeterrence costs if it causes
actors to fail to comply with the reasonableness rule because they discount
the likelihood of ever being held liable for unreasonable conduct.  Error can
also lead to overdeterrence costs if it causes actors to go beyond the
91 This is a good point to confront a problem suggested by the literature on deterrence in tort
law.  Under the economic analysis of torts presented by Landes and Posner, strict liability and
negligence lead to the same level of precaution (or forbearance) among potential injurers.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 64-65.  Put another way, the strict liability and
reasonableness standards lead to the same conduct.  This suggests that we shouldn’t be
concerned at all with the errors generated by applying a strict liability standard instead of a
reasonableness standard, because such errors are costless.  This proposition is incorrect,
however, for at least two reasons.  First, if precaution or forbearance on the part of the
potential victim is desirable, a reasonableness standard may be superior because it provides
the appropriate incentives to potential victims.  See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 69.
Second, if the defendant’s conduct provides substantial external benefits to potential victims,
strict liability may be inferior to the reasonableness rule because it causes potential defendants
to reduce the scale of their activities.  See Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort
Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977 (1996).  For the most part, our analysis in the text focuses on the
purpose of intent rules rather than the choice between strict (per se) liability and
reasonableness tests.
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reasonable level of precaution or forbearance in avoiding harms.  A final
error cost consists of administrative or litigation costs.
The structure of each legal rule should be such that the sum total of error
costs are minimized.  In many circumstances, selecting the appropriate
intent standard is critical to this goal.  Before turning to the contribution of
intent standards, we review the relation of errors to incentives under a
simple conduct standard such as the reasonableness test.
Incentive Effects of Error
In a world where courts are less than perfect, there are errors associated with
every legal test.  Replacing rule A with rule B means trading off the errors
associated with A for those associated with B.  It is important to know not
only how many errors are associated with alternative rules but also the types
of errors the alternative rules generate.  We can distinguish two general
types of error rates: asymmetric and symmetric. Rule A and B might have
similar error rates, but different types.  Rule A’s errors would be symmetric
if it generates roughly equal probabilities of false acquittals and false
convictions.  Rule B’s errors would be asymmetric if its application
generates larger numbers of false convictions than false acquittals (or vice
versa).
The nature of error rates generated by a legal rule—and the change in
rates that would occur if a different rule were adopted—can be surmised in
many instances, though it will not always be obvious on the face of a rule.
Consider the custom rule in tort law,92 under which courts generally refuse
to find a physician’s conduct unreasonable (negligent) if he or she has
complied with the customs of the medical profession.  Given their lack of
information on the science and practice of medicine, juries might deem more
or less activity unreasonable than if they were perfectly informed as to the
costs and benefits of alternative medical procedures.  In other words,
relative to an error-free regime, a shift to a reasonable conduct standard
unconstrained by considerations of custom probably would generate a
symmetrical increase in error types.93
92 As a rule, custom is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the determination of negligence.
The medical profession, however, has received different treatment, with a physician’s
adherence to custom being treated effectively as conclusive evidence that he was not
negligent in many jurisdictions.  See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, at 185-96;
John McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1959).
93 Alternatively, the jury might be inclined to decide against physicians who failed to take a
particular precaution, which would generate an asymmetrical increase (relative to an error-
free regime) in errors, leading to more false convictions than false acquittals.  The argument
for believing this would be the outcome is presented infra note 100 and accompanying text.
Whether the reasonableness rule generates an asymmetrical or symmetrical increase in errors
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Now consider the function of the custom rule in comparison to an
unconstrained reasonableness inquiry (i.e., reasonableness divorced from
custom).  Such a rule change (again, from unconstrained reasonableness to
the custom rule) probably would lead to a greater reduction in the number of
false convictions than in the number of false acquittals.  The change would
lead to an asymmetric distribution of errors -- indeed, perhaps with a
reduction in false convictions coupled with an increase in false acquittals.
The reason for the asymmetry in error types is that the likelihood of an
error in favor of the defendant probably increases if he is judged by the
customs of his profession.  Medical customs are likely to be reasonable, and
physicians are likely to comply with them.  Given this, most false
convictions will occur in the presumably rare cases when the physician
complied with the custom and failed to convince the jury that he did.94 Most
false acquittals, on the other hand, will occur when the physician complied
with a custom that was in fact unreasonable.  If a non-trivial percentage of
customs are outdated or insufficiently developed, this could generate a
substantial number of false acquittals.
We can illustrate this point with a numerical example.  Suppose
malpractice disputes are drawn randomly from the population of physician-
patient interactions (operations), at a rate of 1 out of every 10.  Suppose 95
percent of doctors comply with the medical customs while 5 percent fail to
comply.  Suppose courts erroneously conclude that the physician failed to
comply with custom when in fact she did in 1 out of every 20 cases.
Finally, suppose 15 percent of medical customs are outdated.  From a base
of 10,000 operations, 950 malpractice disputes would occur involving
doctors who complied with the standard, of which 807 involve doctors who
complied with good (not outdated) standards, and 40 of those would result
in false convictions.  The same assumptions give rise to 142 cases involving
doctors who complied with an outdated rule, and 135 false acquittals.
Of course, an asymmetric distribution of error types need not occur under
the custom rule.  For example, if all doctors comply with custom, and all
customs are reasonable, then the only type of error that can occur is a false
conviction.  Our illustration adopts the assumption, which we regard as
plausible, that the likelihood of an erroneous finding with respect to custom
is not central to the argument we make in the text here.  Our tentative assertion that the
increase would be symmetrical is in part a simplifying assumption, and in part based on
Holmes’ view that an unconstrained reasonableness inquiry would leave the jury “oscillating
to and fro” with respect to the negligence standard.  See HOLMES, supra note 83, at 123.
94 Another set of false convictions includes the case where physician (reasonably) deviated
from the custom and failed to justify the deviation.  But this is a very small group to begin
with.  For example, if only 5 percent of physicians deviate from custom, this is a small base
from which to consider the rate of false acquittals.  Given the likely insignificance of this
component of error, we will exclude it from consideration here.
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compliance is less than the likelihood that a particular custom will be
outdated.
Our discussion of the custom example helps to clarify the meaning of
“error probability” in our analysis.  Generally, we are referring to the
frequency of error in its complex, Bayesian sense,95 taking into account
changes in the underlying base-populations from which disputes are drawn.
This is the sense that translates easily into statements about the numbers of
false convictions relative to false acquittals.  Thus, if a move from rule A to
rule B generates a substantial increase in the likelihood that a particular
defendant type (e.g., guilty defendants) will litigate, our conception of the
probability of error takes into account the implications of such an increase
for the numbers of false convictions and false acquittals.  There is a simpler
notion of error referring to the likelihood that a judge will make a mistake
in a particular case.  The frequency of false convictions will be a function
of this simple error (judicial error) and the underlying distribution of
defendant types.  Asymmetries in simple error rates coupled with
asymmetry in the distribution of defendant types can make the frequency of
false convictions larger (or smaller) than one would surmise on the basis of
an examination of the likelihood of judicial error in a particular case.
We want to emphasize two points about the relation between errors and
incentive effects.  The first is that whether a rule overdeters, underdeters, or
deters optimally depends on the distribution of errors.  By that, we mean the
symmetry or asymmetry of errors first, but we also refer to the way errors
increase or decrease in relation to the behavior to be sanctioned.  The
second is that even though error may lead to overdeterrence or
underdeterrence under a reasonable conduct rule, the more likely effect is
overdeterrence.
95 More formally, let P(G|I) be the probability that the court holds the defendant guilty even
though he is innocent.  Let P(G|N) be the probability the court holds the defendant guilty
when he is guilty.  Let P(I) be the probability that the defendant is innocent (or the share of
innocent defendants in the pool of litigants reaching final judgment).  Then the probability a
conviction is false, P(I|G), is, using Bayes’ theorem, P(G|I)P(I)/[P(G|I)P(I)+P(G|N)(1-P(I))].
P(G|I) corresponds to the “simple error” (or judicial error) described in the text.  P(I|G) is the
more complex notion of error referred to in the text.  Note that if the shares of innocent and
guilty defendants are the same (i.e., P(I) = 1/2), these two notions of error are identical.  Thus,
if the legal rule induces no asymmetry in the shares of guilty and innocent defendants in
court, our complex and simple notions of error are equivalent; and the probability of judicial
error tells us everything we need to know about the number of false convictions (and false
acquittals).  On Bayes’ theorem and the law, see Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971); David Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1979).
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Incentive Effects of Error Under a Reasonable Conduct Standard:
An Illustration
We will illustrate these points with the following example.  Suppose the
owner of a cricket field has to decide whether to raise his fence to prevent
balls from flying over and injuring passers-by on adjacent streets.  The
fence is now at 12 feet, and the expected harm to passers-by is $301.  The
owner can raise the fence in one-foot increments at a cost of $50 per foot.
The expected harm to passers-by for each fence height between 12 feet and
18 feet is:
Fence
Height
  12'   13'   14'   15'   16'   17'   18'
Expected
Harm
$301 $250 $175 $100 $65 $40 $30
Now look at three versions of the possible effects of the owner’s decision.
In both the settings indicated by Figure 2 and Figure 3, the owner faces a
legal rule that generates symmetric errors, though with different error rates
across cases.96  In the setting depicted in Figure 4, he faces a rule that
generates asymmetric errors.  The rules yield underdeterrence, optimal
deterrence, and overdeterrence respectively (with the likely action indicated
in bold).
Figure 2 reflects a judicial process that makes more errors as the fence
height approaches the threshold between reasonable (15 feet) and
unreasonable (under 15 feet), symmetrically distributed around the optimal
point.  The errors have the effect of diminishing the private gain from
adding to the fence height once it is high enough to approach the
reasonableness standard, yielding underdeterrence.
96 The results in this section are consistent with the more formal treatment of uncertainty in
Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. LAW,
ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986).  Note that in the example in the text, we are relying on the simple
notion of error as the likelihood that a particular judge makes a mistake in applying the legal
rule.  The more complex Bayesian notion referred to in the text accompanying note 95 is
unnecessary for this discussion.
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Fence
  Height
  12'  13'   14'   15'   16'   17'   18'
Expected
  Harm
$301 $250 $175  $100  $65  $40  $30
Social
 Savings
  —   $1  $25 $25 -$15 - 35 - 40
Error Rate  .0  .2  .5  .5  .5   .2   .0
Expected
  Liability
$301 $200 $87.5  $50 $32.5  $8  .0
Private
 Savings
  —  $51 $62.5 - $12.5 - $32.5 -$25.5 -$42
Figure 2
Figure 3, like Figure 2, addresses a setting with symmetric errors, with
error rates altered only slightly from Figure 2.  Yet, as Figure 3 shows, the
variation in error rates around the optimal point suggests a different
outcome.  In this setting, although the return from actually achieving the
socially optimal (reasonable) outcome is muted by errors, the owner’s
private savings from increasing the height of the fence induces optimal
expenditures.
Fence
  Height
  12'  13'   14'   15'   16'   17'    18'
Expected
  Harm
$301 $250 $175 $100   $65   $40   $30
Social
 Savings
  —   $1  $25 $25  -$15  -$35  -$40
Error Rate  .0  .1  .4  .5   .4   .1    .0
Expected
Liability
$301 $225 $105 $50  $26   $4    $0
Private
 Savings
  — $26 $70  $5 -$26  -$28  -$46
Figure 3
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Figure 4 shows the effect of asymmetric errors.  Symmetric errors can
yield varied outcomes, but asymmetric errors push expenditures away from
the optimum, in this case producing overdeterrence.
Fence
  Height
  12'  13'   14'   15'   16'   17'   18'
Expected
  Harm
$301 $250 $175 $100 $65 $40 $30
Social
 Savings
  —   $1  $25 $25 -$15 -$35 -$40
Error Rate  .0  .0  .0   .8   .4  .1   .0
Expected
  Liability
$301 $250 $175 $80  $26   $4  $0
Private
 Savings
  —   $1 $25 $45   $4 -$28 -$46
Figure 4
Although we could equally well present a table showing asymmetric
errors leading to underdeterrence, we have chosen this example for a
reason.  We think there is a greater probability that error in the application
of conduct rules will result in overdeterrence.97  This is due largely to the
tendency for errors (simple errors) to be asymmetric, in the sense
(suggested in Figure 4) that a potential defendant who fails to forbear or
take a salient precaution is more likely, other things being equal, to have the
error go against him than in his favor.98  This effect can be amplified by the
influence of litigation costs.
One can offer a simple explanation for the claim that errors will tend to
go against the defendant who fails to take care, a defense that does not rely
on the assumption that courts are inherently biased.  Because of limited
information on the social costs and benefits of certain  conduct, courts are
likely to put a great deal of weight on the absence of a particular precau-
97 Note that this conclusion differs from that of Craswell & Calfee, supra note 96.  Craswell
and Calfee generate overdeterrence in cases where the error probability distribution has a low
variance around the optimal level of care.  This is certainly consistent with Figure 4.
Moreover, if we interpret Craswell and Calfee’s variance result as saying that overdeterrence
is more likely when almost all of the uncertainty is located in the region of the
reasonableness threshold, then it provides a powerful and sufficient reason for our
conclusion.  However, we emphasize a different reason in the text.  Note also that we are
assuming defendants are not judgment-proof, in which case they are unlikely to be deterred by
the threat of litigation, see generally Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L
REV. LAW & ECON. 45 (1986).
98 The deterrence implications of this assumption are spelled out formally infra note 107.
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tion.99  That is, instead of trying to determine the optimal fence height as a
starting point, courts tend to focus on the plaintiff’s claim that the
defendant failed to forbear or to take a particular precaution—that he failed
to raise the fence a certain number of feet, to put netting over the fence, and
so on.  Ideally, a reasonableness determination would require a court to
compare the cost of the forgone precaution to its social benefit (in terms of
harm reduction).  However, as neither the cost nor the social benefit can be
measured precisely, courts are put in the position of making inferences.
Unless there is concrete evidence that the cost of precaution is unusually
high for the defendant (i.e., more than the defendant’s word), the rational
inference is that the defendant acted negligently.  Thus, the structure of
decision-making in courts should tend to produce more errors against than
in favor of defendants who fail to take a salient precaution.100
We note that there is an alternative behavioral theory of error bias that,
like the one presented here, does not assume an inherent preference for
plaintiffs.  The bias typically is explained by the fact that the decision-
maker generally is choosing between imposing liability on a defendant who
has insured or who otherwise is able to allocate some portion of his costs to
others and a plaintiff who seems less able to do so (especially as his
insurance option cannot be exercised retroactively).101  An erroneous pro-
99 See Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989).
100 The outcome depends as well on other aspects of the court system’s performance.  See,
e.g., Mark Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L. J. 799 (1983);
Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule, 28 J.
LEGAL STUD. 427 (1989).  Grady and Kahan show that overdeterrence may occur (note that
our claim in the text is stronger) if the court applies a negligence standard without reducing
the defendant’s damages by the amount that would have occurred even if the defendant had
complied with the due-care standard.  Put another way, if courts apply the causation standard
rigorously, overdeterrence will not result.  However, the causation requirement is not applied
rigorously in all cases falling under a reasonable conduct standard.  For example, in many
negligence cases where causation is uncertain—e.g., medical malpractice actions for “lost
chance of survival” where the plaintiff had more than a 50 percent chance of survival before
the accident—courts award plaintiffs their full damages without reducing by the amount that
would have been suffered in any event.  See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative,
664 P.2d 474, 476-9 (Wash. 1983) (discussing “all or nothing” approach in majority of
states).
101 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(New York: Basic Books 1988); RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS (New York:
Free Press 1988); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (New York: Dutton 1991).   Although these books are not
works of “cognitive science,” their jury-bias arguments reflect hypotheses regarding common
cognitive or decision biases.  The empirical support for these theories is mixed, and largely
anecdotal.  Examination of tried cases reveals that plaintiffs lose more often in personal injury
litigation than in commercial litigation, data that are inconsistent with a jury bias story.
However, evaluation of these data is complicated by distortion in the selection of cases for
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plaintiff finding will have implications for costs among a wider class of
people, but these costs are apt to be minuscule in relation to the
expenditures of the class so long as other legal fact-finders do not similarly
err.  An erroneous pro-defendant finding, however, will impose obvious
costs on an individual whose distress is evident to the fact-finder.  
Now consider the influence of litigation costs.  In general, in a setting
with legal error and costly litigation, the reasonableness (or, in this case,
negligence) test can overdeter, underdeter, or optimally deter—all three
outcomes are possible.102  Litigation costs have conflicting effects on the
incentives for precaution.  On one hand, since litigation is costly for
plaintiffs, the cost will prevent some victims from bringing suit,103 which
weakens the incentive for precaution.104  On the other hand, since the
defendant must pay to litigate as well, expected liability increases for
potential defendants with the cost of litigation, which increases the
incentive for precaution.  In regimes with symmetric litigation costs for
plaintiffs and defendants, the effect of litigation costs on deterrence is
uncertain.  In some areas of litigation, however, litigation costs are
relatively low for plaintiffs and high for defendants.  This occurs, for
example, where defendant bears a heavier burden of producing information
relevant to the litigation or where defendant has a greater stake in the
outcome of the litigation (e.g., the defendant has reputation costs at stake or
trial.  See, e.g. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L REV. 1 (1996).  For a broad review of civil juries’
operation, see Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408 (1997).
102 Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J. LAW, ECON. &
ORG. 433 (1990).
103 This reflects the assumption that plaintiffs will not bring suit when the cost of litigating
exceeds the expected recovery, a standard assumption in the economic analysis of litigation,
see, e.g, Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict
Liability and Under Negligence, 10 INT. REV. L. & ECON. 161, 163 (1990).  Whether this
assumption is valid in all cases depends on plaintiffs’ ability to generate settlements without
the full investment in litigation costs.   Suppose, for example, litigation occurs in two discrete
stages.  If the plaintiff can credibly threaten to go through the second stage, he may have an
incentive to file suit in order to obtain a settlement after the first stage, even though the total
cost of litigation (summing over both stages) is less than the expected final judgment.  For a
formal presentation of this argument, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning
the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1996).  Of course, if the
first stage expenses are sufficiently high, this outcome will not be observed.  The discussion
in the text reflects the view that taking account of settlements—while essential to a full
understanding of incentive effects of legal rules—would complicate the analysis without
changing the basic point.
104 See Hylton, supra note 103.
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risks follow-on litigation while plaintiffs do not).  In such regimes,
litigation costs are likely to generate overdeterrence.105
Thus, although overdeterrence is by no means guaranteed under a
reasonable conduct rule, it is the more likely result in view of the probable
asymmetry in simple errors (judicial mistakes).106  Moreover, any
overdeterrence associated with a reasonableness standard will tend to be
exaggerated by various other potential factors, including general increases
in error probabilities, asymmetric litigation costs burdening defendants, and
assessment of legal damages in excess of the real social loss associated with
the defendant’s conduct.107 Damages exceed victim’s loss: Finally, it should be
105 For example, under a regime in which the prevailing plaintiff shifts his litigation expenses
to the defendant, overdeterrence is more likely.  For discussion of the incentive effects of
litigation cost apportionment rules, see Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A
Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 55 (1982); Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance
with the Negligence Standard, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 457 (1993).
106 Some commentators argue that this is the prevalent pattern in litigation today.  See, e.g.,
HUBER, supra note 99; NEELEY, supra note 99; OLSON, supra note 99.
107 Consider the following formal demonstration.  Let x = the cost of taking care or
forbearing, p = probability of loss to victim if injurer does not take care or forbear, q =
probability of loss to victim if injurer does take care or forbear, p > q.  Let v = loss to victim.
Let θ  = probability of an erroneous finding of liability.
Under a reasonable conduct test such as the negligence test, the injurer will be held
liable whenever he fails to take care (or forbear) and x < (p-q)v.  Now consider injurers for
whom x > (p-q)v.  In an error-free regime, such an injurer would never be held liable.  Such
injurers will be held liable only if courts make mistakes.
Now suppose the likelihood of a court making a mistake is zero if the injurer takes care
or forbears (e.g., keeps his fence well above the reasonable height).  Suppose also that the
probability of error is positive at the threshold of reasonable conduct.
Consider the incentives of an injurer for whom x > (p-q)v.  Overdeterrence occurs if
such an injurer is induced by the threat of liability to take care.  Will this ever happen?  Such
an injurer will take care if
x < pθv ,
which requires (p-q)v < pθv, or
(p-q)/p < θ.
Since this is clearly possible, overdeterrence can occur. For example, suppose p = 2/3 and q =
½.  Then overdeterrence will occur whenever θ is greater than 25 percent.  If the probability
of error is especially high near the threshold of reasonable conduct, then θ > 1/4 may be a
plausible assumption.  Moreover, as this example suggests, whenever precaution is not very
productive, in the sense that (p-q)/p is close to zero, we are likely to get overdeterrence.
Litigation costs: If litigation costs are included in the analysis, the risk of overdeterrence
increases substantially.  Let c = injurer/defendant’s litigation cost.  In this case,
overdeterrence occurs if
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clear that if damages exceed the real social loss, overdeterrence can occur.  Suppose the
damage award is equal to d > v.  Now overdeterrence occurs if (p-q)v < p(d + c).  We
will argue below that these factors are especially relevant in the antitrust
context.
B. Tailoring Legal Rules to Reduce Error Costs
If we put to one side possible “political” preferences that might distort the
the process,108 legal rules should be designed to accomplish optimal
deterrence or governance with the lowest possible error cost.  Given the
array of possible effects that errors in rule application can generate, how
should conduct rules be tailored to minimize error costs?
Factors Affecting the Probability of Error
In a legal regime that minimizes error costs, we should expect rules to be
designed in order to exploit environmental factors that constrain error costs.
One such factor is the competence of the court to discern reasonable
conduct.  In the paradigmatic common law example of a reasonable conduct
(p-q)v < pθ(v + c),
or [(p-q)/p][v/(v+c)] < θ, which is quite plausible.  Again suppose p = 2/3 and q = ½.
Litigants often spend a third or more of the amount at stake on litigation, so let us assume c =
v/3.  In this case, overdeterrence occurs when θ > 3/16.  On the one-third assumption, see
JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 69 (Santa Monica: RAND, 1986) (data showing defendant’s litigation costs
running at roughly one third of total compensation).
108 Of course, as emphasized in the public choice literature, interest-group politics plays an
obvious role in legislative decision-making.  See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (Ann Arbor: Univ of Michigan Press 1962); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE II (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1989); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1965).  See also ROBERT DAHL,
DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 31-54 (New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press 1982).  The same influences are not at work—certainly not to the same degree—
where judges are the relevant decision-makers.  See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms
and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 942 (1995).  Judicial
decisions might be seen as responding to the same politics as legislative decisions where
judges are expected faithfully to implement legislative directives.  See, e.g., William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary from an Interest Group Perspective,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 875 (1975).  But it is reasonable to expect judges to lean more consistently
toward judgments reflecting a balance of social costs and benefits, see, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory,
1990 B.Y. U. L. REV. 827.
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rule, the negligence rule, courts have relied on the juries or judges applying
common sense judgment to evidence in order to determine whether an actor
was negligent.  In the routine case this has not been seen as something
beyond the competence of the court.  For example, in the case of the fence
around the cricket field, courts have considered themselves competent to
determine whether the owner should raise the fence in order to cut down the
risk of cricket balls hitting pedestrians.  In order to make such an
assessment the court needs information on the likelihood that balls will sail
over a fence of a given height, the likely injuries to pedestrians, and the cost
of raising the fence.  In many settings, information such as this is easily
discoverable—certainly, one would expect learning about these issues to
develop over time in a land where cricket was common and where cricket
pitches tended to be located near pedestrian walkways.109  Those are the
sorts of settings in which common law courts have tended to apply
reasonableness standards.110
In other areas, common law courts are less well-suited to conduct the sort
of open-ended inquiry associated with the reasonableness standard and
generally have taken steps to guard against errors by altering that
standard.111  Again, consider the custom rule.  In medical malpractice
disputes, courts typically determine negligence by the physician’s
compliance with customs of the medical profession.112  The custom rule is,
as noted earlier, designed to avoid the errors that would result in a system
that permitted juries independently to define reasonable medical practice in
every malpractice case.113
Private information is a closely related, yet distinguishable factor that
can be analyzed in the same manner.  If the application of a reasonable
conduct rule depends heavily on information held exclusively by one of the
parties, an error-minimizing legal rule might include a proof standard (an
evidentiary presumption) that would induce provision of the information.
This is the role performed by doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur in tort
109 That does not, of course, mean that the application of a reasonableness rule in such context
will be without controversy.  As one approaches the dividing line between reasonable and
unreasonable activity, fact-finders surely will have different intuitions about the exact location
of that line.
110 See generally HOLMES, supra note 90, at 123-127 (on the connection between common,
daily experience and negligence law).
111 In the limit case, disputes may be subject to a legal standard too open-ended—and involve
individuals and interests too numerous and diffuse—to be suitable to judicial decision-
making.  See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
394-404 (1978).  See also James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
112 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, at 185-96.
113 See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 92.
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law.114  The res ipsa doctrine, in effect, creates a presumption of liability
that can be overcome by the defendant only by revealing his private
information regarding exculpatory evidence.  Thus, res ipsa has the effect
of replacing the reasonable conduct rule with a presumptive strict conduct
rule, in order to give the defendant an incentive to reveal information to the
court, thereby reducing the likelihood of error.
Influence of Intent Standards on Error
In addition to legal presumptions such as the custom rule and res ipsa,
intent standards also influence error probabilities.  Like the custom rule, the
specific intent test may simultaneously reduce the overall likelihood of
error and generate asymmetry in the distribution of errors.  Consider, for
example, the legal standard for assault, which requires proof of specific
intent.  Suppose courts were to instead apply to  assault cases the more
common tort standard combining the reasonableness test with general
intent.  Relative to an error-free regime, a reasonableness test coupled with
general intent probably would lead to significant errors both in favor of the
defendant and the plaintiff.  Determining the reasonableness of an alleged
assault is difficult, not because the relevant information depends on highly
specialized knowledge (as is the case in determining reasonable medical
practice), but because the reasonableness of actions that may put others in
fear of bodily harm so often is highly dependent on nuances of context.
The  important though difficult-to-quantify aspects of expression that can
be intermingled with alleged assaults exemplify this problem.115
The specific intent test, like the custom rule for negligence, may reduce
the overall likelihood of error in this case, relative to the reasonableness
114 Under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, plaintiffs are allowed to submit their negligence
claims to the jury even though their evidence of negligence is largely or entirely
circumstantial, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, at 242; Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng.
Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863).  Other tort law doctrines also have the effect of forcing defendants to
produce evidence to absolve themselves of liability for negligence.  For example, where two
tortfeasors act concurrently, they are both jointly and severally liable, and the burden falls to
each to limit his liability by apportioning the harm.  See Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
115  The connection between assaults and expression is apparent in many of the cases,
including the earliest.  For example, in Tuberville v. Savage, 86 Eng. Rep. 684 (K.B. 1669),
the plaintiff put his hand on his sword and said that if it were not “assize -time” (i.e., if the
judges weren’t in town), he would not tolerate the defendant’s language, see RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 67 (Boston: Little, Brown, 6th ed. 1995).  The
court rejected the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff’s conduct amounted to an assault, which
justified his wounding the plaintiff.  As in Tuberville, assault cases often force courts to draw
a line between threatening words and threatening conduct. For a more detailed discussion of
this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 202 and 203.
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test.  Moreover, it will almost surely cause a greater reduction in the
probability of a false conviction than that of a false acquittal.  The latter
effect is easy to see: requiring specific intent biases the legal test in favor of
defendants.  The former effect, an overall reduction in the likelihood of
error, is less certain.  However, it may result if courts are more likely to
reach the right conclusion (finding conduct unreasonable only when social
costs outweigh social benefits) under the specific intent test than under a
reasonableness test that requires the consideration of such ill-defined
benefits as the value of expression.
Factors Affecting Error Costs
In some cases market (or social) factors have the effect of constraining or
increasing the error costs associated with a legal rule.  In such cases, error-
minimizing courts will adopt rules that exploit the effects of constraining
factors.  For example, market or competitive pressures may constrain the
costs associated with an error type.
Return to the custom rule in tort law.  The custom rule prevents courts
from applying a reasonableness test in areas outside of their competence,
which reduces the probabilities of a false convictions and acquittals.
However, the custom rule may increase the probability of a false acquittal,
under plausible assumptions.116  In spite of this, the cost of false acquittals
under the custom rule will be constrained by other pressures if information
about physicians’ practices is reasonably available to potential patients (or
other health care decision-makers).  Under plausible assumptions about the
availability of such information, physicians who adopted practice customs
that were unreasonable (causing unnecessary harms to patients) would lose
business to other physicians with better practices, and indeed the whole
profession would lose business if it adhered to unreasonable customs. This
would constrain the behavior of individual physicians to some extent and,
over time, of the profession as a whole.  Given these market pressures, the
costs of false acquittals under the custom rule should be low relative to the
costs associated with errors generated under a reasonableness test.
In contrast with this hypothetical, when an error associated with a
particular reasonableness test generates a market advantage in favor of a
particular type of defendant, it is safe to assume that the beneficiaries of the
error will act to protect and to fully exploit their advantage, increasing the
costs associated with the error.  Given this potential, error-cost minimizing
116 See discussion supra text at notes 92-94.
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courts have limited the degree of protection provided by such rules, in order
to dampen the acquisitive or “rent-seeking”117 incentives of beneficiaries.
Nuisance rules in tort law and rules governing competition in the market
have the potential to generate market advantages for their beneficiaries.  In
both settings, actions that harm an individual are protected as socially
beneficial, even though it is possible that an opposite conclusion might be
appropriate in a sub-class of cases.  For example, nuisance law generally
does not regulate aesthetic disturbances, such as invasions of claims to light
and air.118  An individual whose view of the beach has been blocked by a
developer cannot maintain a nuisance action.  If the rule were reversed,
permitting nuisance claims for aesthetic disturbances, potential plaintiffs
could gain the power to control future development in their communities by
being the first to arrive.  This would include the right to hold up potential
defendants to pay off difficult-to-verify claims of aesthetic injury.
The costs associated with the creation of market advantages probably
justify the early common law regarding the reasonableness of price
competition.  Courts generally refused to hold it unreasonable for one seller
to undercut the prices of another seller.119  In other words, courts
established a per se rule in favor of price competition.  This rule minimizes
the errors against socially beneficial competition and does so at low cost, as
there is no need for protracted litigation to establish the point.  Suppose,
however, courts had decided to adopt a reasonableness test.  Many sellers
faced with the prospect of harm from price competition would then have an
incentive to bring suit, even if they were unlikely to receive compensation
under the reasonableness test, so long as the expected value of the suit plus
suit-induced price increases exceeded the cost of litigation.  The burden of
such litigation would fall primarily on those with the lowest costs (the
obvious targets for suit).  Under these conditions, the threat of expensive
litigation could deter market entry by some low-cost sellers.
117 We will use the term “rent-seeking” with greater frequency in the remainder.  Here we use
the term to refer to self-interested efforts to gain or protect a social or market advantage.  On
rent-seeking generally, see GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND
RENT-SEEKING (Norwell, MA: Kluwer 1989); Anne Krueger, The Economics of the Rent
Seeking Society, 64 AMER. ECON. REV. 291 (1974).  Later in the text, we will focus on the
rent-seeking incentives created by legal rules.
118 E.g., Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
App. 1959).
119 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Vol. 3, at 218-219.
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Intent Standards’ and Proof Rules’ Effects on Error Costs
In an ideal world without error, a court could apply a reasonable conduct
test to all cases without having to inquire into intent (beyond the general
level) or into standards of proof.  In such an ideal regime, the
reasonableness rule could be applied in a manner that punishes and
therefore deters only conduct that is socially undesirable.  It follows from
this observation that many peculiar features of the law may be designed
largely to control error costs.
In a world where error has not been banished, an optimal framework of
legal rules minimizes the overall expected cost of error by making tradeoffs
among different types of error and different costs—tradeoffs that would be
unnecessary in an error-free regime.  For example, given a choice between
two rules, one with a high probability of a false acquittal and the other with
a high probability of a false conviction, error costs may be minimized by
choosing the rule with the higher false acquittal rate if the cost of a false
acquittal is smaller than that of false conviction.  This is the justification we
have offered for the custom rule in tort law.
Intent standards also can reduce error costs, partly as a direct result of
their effect in reducing errors in rule application.  Intent standards are most
important when, in addition to reducing errors, they reduce errors with high
costs, as where the error discourages especially valuable activities.
Consider, for example, the legal standard for assault, which requires proof
of specific intent.  The assault standard can be justified on the ground that it
reduces errors that discourage expression,120 which the law has long treated
as having special value.  The legal rules governing assault and the custom
defense are similar in that they both induce an asymmetry in errors that
favors defendants.  However, they are different in the sense that there are
distinguishable error-cost arguments favoring each rule; while the custom
rule can be defended on the ground that false acquittal costs are probably
small, the assault standard can be defended on the ground that false
conviction costs are probably large.121
120 See supra note 115.
121 This is a good point to return to the punitive damages rule noted in Figure 1, supra.  Our
theory suggests that specific intent is required for punitive damages because that standard
minimizes error costs.  Given that they are potentially limitless, punitive damages are best
reserved for conduct that is always socially undesirable, in the sense that the gain to the
offender is unlikely to ever be greater than the victim’s loss.  See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive
Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L. J. 421 (1999).  Awarding
punitive damages in cases outside of this category overdeters socially desirable conduct.  In
order to select out those cases in which the defendant’s conduct is always socially
undesirable, the specific intent test is probably far superior to the reasonable conduct test, id.
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But intent standards can increase some types of error costs, depending on
how they are implemented.  Recall our earlier discussion of Henry firing a
gun in George’s direction.122  If Henry is a fine marksman who enjoys
startling his friends, he presents a far different risk of harm than if Henry is
a less able shot who bears a grudge against George and was trying to kill
him.  For this reason, getting some sense of Henry’s specific intent is
helpful in determining the social risk presented by his conduct.  On the
other hand, suppose Henry, intending to kill George, aims and fires at a
picture of George tacked against a tree in a desolate woods.  In this case,
Henry’s intent is an unreliable measure of the social risk associated with his
conduct.  If, as we hypothesize, intent rules reduce expected error costs, the
law generally should be constructed to avoid reliance on intent standards
that can mislead, either adopting a different standard or insisting on a
combination of intent and effect that mitigates  risks posed by the intent
standard alone.
Our two descriptions of Henry’s adventures illustrate the difference
between an objective and subjective conception of specific intent.  It should
be clear from this example that if we are concerned with deterring
undesirable conduct, the objective standard is more reliable.  The subjective
standard is uncertain and only loosely connected to the regulation of
harmful conduct, possibly excusing Henry after he fires directly at George
and kills him, and possibly convicting Henry after he shoots the tree. 123
Such a standard has the potential to deter some socially desirable conduct,
where there is a risk that a prosecutor or plaintiff can find evidence of a bad
intent.
Minimizing error costs also provides the standard explanation for the
burden of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”124 in American criminal law.
The reasonable doubt standard obviously increases the likelihood of a false
acquittal if compared to the civil preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard probably increases the overall
likelihood of error.125  However,  under the prevailing view that the costs of
at 455-458.  Under this view, the specific intent test minimizes the potential error costs
associated with punitive awards.
122 Supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
123 Whether Henry is excused will turn on the conclusion respecting his state of mind and the
legal standard.  If the standard is not intent to kill but reckless disregard for the possibility
that Henry will kill George, Henry might be convicted on the first assumed state of facts.  This
result, however, is not a foregone conclusion.
124 The Supreme Court has held that the due process clauses of the United States Constitution
require proof “beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. . .
charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
125 The preponderance standard permits courts to weigh the evidence according to its
persuasiveness and to accept the most plausible account of the facts. Provided the trial
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false convictions outweigh those of false acquittals, the reasonable doubt
standard probably minimizes the total costs of error.126
C. Application to Antitrust
Antitrust provides a special and important case for the application of an
error cost analysis of legal rules.  Unlike most common law subjects,
antitrust rules govern competing claims to the allocation of consumer or
producer surplus from business activities.  For these cases, competitive
conditions—not only in the narrow sense of the presence or absence of
short-run market power—play an important role in determining the costs of
error.
Error Probabilities in Antitrust
Error probabilities in antitrust are determined by the same factors as
observed generally, the competence of the court to apply a reasonableness
test and the allocation of private information.  To the extent a
reasonableness standard requires a court to examine business records and
determine whether a competitive decision was justifiable in light of
business conditions, it pushes courts beyond their areas of expertise.
Moreover, reasonableness standards that cannot be applied without detailed
information exclusively within the hands of only one of the parties are
likely to result in errors asymmetrically favoring the informed party.
The per se rule of antitrust is a response to competence and private
information problems, especially the latter.  Given the asymmetry in access
to private information, a requirement on the part of plaintiffs or prosecutors
to prove the unreasonableness of a pricing arrangement would give a
virtually insurmountable advantage to defendants in price-fixing cases.  The
problem is not primarily, as some have argued, courts’ inability to assess
involves no issues outside of the competence of the court—including within that caveat the
provision that the court is not affected by perceptual distortions or incentives that depart from
an inclination to increase social welfare—this should produce the smallest number of errors.
126 Two reasons can be offered for believing that false conviction costs are greater than false
acquittal costs.  The first is that the cost of criminal punishment is often unusually large, since
it often involves the loss of liberty to the individual and the loss to society of the defendant’s
labor.  The theory suggested in In re Winship is that the cost to the individual (in terms of
reputational harm and potential loss of liberty) justify the assumption that false conviction
costs outweigh false acquittal costs, see DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 54.  We can suggest a
second reason for believing false convictions are more costly than false acquittals: in a regime
in which false convictions occur frequently, dominant coalitions will have an incentive to use
the criminal laws to punish weak coalitions.  This concern is reflected in the case law
controlling the clarity of criminal statutes.  See DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 31-35.
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whether a defendant’s reasonableness arguments were valid.  It is fair
enough to claim that pricing decisions often depend on considerations that
are difficult for courts to assess, but that is not the crux of the inquiry in
price-fixing cases.  The greater problem is that, a reasonableness inquiry in
this context would depend heavily on information in the hands of the
defendants.  In such cases, we should expect errors disproportionately
favoring defendants, generating underdeterrence costs.
A more evident competence problem is raised by Judge Hand’s
application of the reasonableness test in Alcoa.  Hand’s approach requires a
court to examine capacity expansion decisions to determine whether they
were made preemptively to foreclose competition or reasonably to meet
projected demand.127  This standard asks judges to evaluate the basis for
capacity decisions, to assess the business opportunities facing the industry
and specific firms at the time capacity decisions are made.  That asks judges
to make decisions akin to those at times delegated to members of public
utility regulatory commissions.128  Even regulators who are quite familiar
with the industries they oversee have difficulty making these sorts of
judgments.129  Judges, however, seldom have familiarity with the industries
involved in monopolization cases.  This makes errors especially likely.
Error attributable to the court’s lack of competence may, as we have
noted, work in favor of defendants or plaintiffs.  Still, given that such error
is likely to be most pronounced when the defendant’s conduct is near the
threshold of reasonable conduct, and the defendant did not forbear from
some particular act alleged to be anticompetitive, the likely effect of such
error is overdeterrence.130  Indeed, in the antitrust context, the likelihood of
127  See the discussion of Judge Hand’s analysis in Alcoa, supra text accompanying notes 58-
61.
128 We should note that there is reason to doubt that Judge Hand meant for his Alcoa test to
be applied in this way.  Judge Hand was generally quite resistant to tests that would have
judges make such intrusive determinations.  See,e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).  See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1994).
129 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 36-59 (Cambridge: Harvard
Univ. Press 1982). For a general (sympathetic) overview of agency expertise, see James O.
Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1976).  A more
critical look at agency expertise is Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications
Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169 (1978).
130 See discussion supra notes 96, 97 and accompanying text.  One might think this claim is
inconsistent with our initial discussion of the custom rule.  We noted in that discussion that
errors may go in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant under an unconstrained reasonableness
test.  However, we were unconcerned in that discussion with determining whether an
unconstrained reasonableness test (divorced from custom) presents a risk of overdeterrence;
our concern then was whether the custom rule generated asymmetric errors.  If we were to
reconsider the effects of an unconstrained reasonableness inquiry in the malpractice context,
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overdeterrence from such error is high for two additional reasons.  First,
litigation costs borne by defendants are likely to be large.  The antitrust
laws shift the litigation expenses of prevailing plaintiffs to defendants.131
The issues adjudicated are complex; they relate to business decisions that
frequently cannot be evaluated independent of a wealth of business records;
and the potential costs of adverse decisions frequently are large.132   Second,
given that the risk of error is greatest when the court is reviewing
procompetitive conduct that harms rivals, damages designed to compensate
injured rivals will exceed the real social loss, since they do not include an
offset for the benefits to consumers.  Thus, in order to steer clear of the
possibility of a monopolization suit under the Alcoa standard, firms will
have an incentive to avoid capacity expansion investments, unless they can
be defended with projections showing that the dominant firm intended to
meet a growing residual demand that could not be satisfied by competitors.
Error Costs in Antitrust
Antitrust is unique largely in the sense that competition plays a central role
in determining the costs associated with error.  The error costs in antitrust
are affected largely by two types of competition: market restraints and rent
seeking.  By market restraints, we mean competitive threats that prevent a
party from exploiting advantages created by errors associated with a
particular legal standard.  By rent-seeking, we refer to incentives to protect,
maximize and exploit advantages created by errors associated with a
particular legal standard.
What are the costs associated with false acquittals and false convictions,
and how are they affected by the competitive pressures such as market
restraints and rent seeking?  We consider this below.
taking into account the arguments associated with figures 2-5, we would have to admit that
there is a tendency toward overdeterrence, given the likelihood that a court would find a
physician liable when his conduct approached the reasonableness threshold and he failed to
take some particular precaution.
131 Clayton Act § 4.
132 The first two factors, complexity of issues and the need for business records, are
unavoidable components of or “inputs” into the defendant’s legal argument, and in this sense
are directly related  to defendant’s litigation costs.  The third factor, the prospect of a
damaging adverse decision, increases (other things being equal) the defendant’s willingness
to pay for his legal defense.
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False Acquittal Costs
False acquittal occurs if firms are held not to be liable although in fact they
engaged in socially-harmful conduct—a conspiracy under Section 1 or
monopolization under Section 2—where harm to consumers outweighs the
social benefits.  Whether we are considering Section 1 or Section 2
violations, false acquittals generate underdeterrence costs.  Firms, aware of
the likelihood that courts will err in their favor, will be less likely to take
precautions or forbear from conduct that violates the Sherman Act.  Under
both Sections 1 and 2, underdeterrence costs take the particular form of
consumer surplus losses that result from monopoly prices.
We will say more about this harm in a moment, but the very notion of
this harm has an attractive property.  Because the harm from false acquittal
in antitrust cases typically is transmitted through excessively high prices
and low output, several market forces combine to constrain false acquittal
costs in antitrust.  Consider the false acquittal costs associated with Section
1.  These costs are constrained by the following market restraints: (1) entry,
(2) competition from incumbent firms, and (3) strategic factors.
The effect of entry is easy to understand.  A successful price-fixing cartel
encourages firms on the sidelines to enter the market and offer the item sold
by the cartel at a lower price.  The ease of entry is critical to the degree of
constraint associated with this factor.133  In a market in which entry is easy,
and likely to occur rapidly, the false acquittal costs associated with Section
1 are likely to be negligible.  Of course, if entry is easy and rapid, the cartel
is unlikely to be in place long enough or to have enough effect to be subject
to suit.  Still, entry must be seen within some parameter as constraining the
operation of cartels and, hence, the costs of false acquittals.
Competition from existing firms provides another constraint on false
acquittal costs under Section 1.  If there are existing firms outside of the
cartel that are operating in the same market, we should expect them to take
advantage of the cartel’s output-restraining policy in order to expand their
businesses.  This happened, for example, in response to formation of the
OPEC cartel.134  Of course, it would make little sense for a cartel to form in
the presence of an obvious competitive threat.  In OPEC’s case, it took
several years for production by non-OPEC nations to increase sufficiently
to constrain OPEC’s production and pricing flexibility.135  False acquittal in
133 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 48 (1964).
134 See, e.g., ABBAS ALNASRAWI, OPEC IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 7, 24 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1985).
135 Indeed, as we were writing this paper, the OPEC cartel regained its stability, driving the
price of oil to close to $30/barrel, see Volte Face, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 79
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such circumstances allows above-market returns—and associated consumer
losses—during the time it takes other firms to offset the conspiracy-
generated output reduction.
The more common scenario is one in which competition from incumbent
firms can offset production cuts more swiftly.  This is likely to lead to
“limit pricing,” a strategy of setting price in order to deter expansion by
incumbents (or new entry).136  Suppose the existing firms are selling the
same goods, but in a geographically distinct market.  They could sell the
goods in the same market as the cartel operates, but—prior to the cartel’s
action—choose not to because transportation costs prevent them from
offering a competitive price.  Still, the existence of these firms puts a
ceiling on the price the cartel can charge.  If that ceiling happens to be
above the joint-profit maximizing price for the cartel (because transport
costs are extremely high relative to product value, for example), the ceiling
will not constrain the cartel.  However, if it is below the cartel’s joint-profit
maximizing price, it will force the cartel to lower its price to a level just
below the ceiling.  Although the cartel still operates, and still imposes
losses in welfare on consumers, the losses are constrained by the threat of
expansion or entry at any price above the ceiling.
The third factor constraining the underdeterrence costs associated with
false acquittals are strategic factors.  Price-fixing agreements are difficult
to maintain, given the incentives of cartel members to cheat.  In addition to
this incentive, there is also the incentive on the part of cartel customers to
induce instability.  Cartel customers can induce instability through several
methods.  They can report cheating by one member to other members of the
cartel, thus weakening the resolve of cartel members to stick with the price
restraint.137  Unless the cartel members have a means of checking on the
validity of such reports, consumers have incentives to issue false reports of
cheating as well.  Alternatively, consumers can purchase through a single
buying agent, altering the relationship into one of bilateral monopoly.  The
buying agent can induce instability by encouraging coalitions or members
within the cartel to consider a separate deal.
(discussing effects of Mexican energy minister Luis Tellez’s efforts to revive OPEC).  Rival
non-OPEC oil suppliers have not yet entered the market with sufficient volume to drive the
price back down, and it may take them several months, perhaps years.  And the incentive for
rivals to enter is clearly dampened by the prospect that the cartel may again lose control over
the production levels of members, causing the price to collapse.
136 On limit pricing see, F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 356- 374 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990); Darius W.
Gaskins, Jr., Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing Under Threat of Entry, 3 J. ECON.
THEORY 306 (September 1971).
137 Stigler, supra note 133.
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Under Section 2, the threat of entry and of competition from incumbent
firms in the industry play similar roles.  A dominant firm that consistently
charges monopoly prices will attract entrants to its market.  As with cartels,
the speed of entry—and, in markets with differentiated goods, the
comparability of the entrants’ products—is critical to the degree of
constraint.138  Strategic factors also play a role in constraining costs if
customers seek substitute supply sources in order credibly to threaten to
break off business with the dominant firm.139
Academic commentary in recent years has focused increasingly on the
ways in which decisions of firms with market power can affect rivals.140
False acquittals can retard market competition in some instances, if
anticompetitive conduct that limits the prospect of successful entry or
expansion goes undeterred.  For that reason, there has been special concern
over practices such as predatory pricing, which—if there is a durable
monopoly—can drive rivals from the market and then impose excessive
costs on consumers.141  There is considerable debate, however, as to the
plausibility of assumptions necessary to sustain predatory pricing and
similar practices.142
138 E.g., Steven C. Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 551, 556 (1986).
139 For example, in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227 (1st Cir.1983),
the defendant, in order to develop an alternative source of supply for mechanical snubbers,
supported the plaintiff’s entry into the market.  This support included financing product
development costs and a commitment to purchase roughly $10 million worth of snubbers.
140 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940 (1986); Michael H.
Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON. REV.
335 (1979).
141 See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); Patrick Bolton, Joseph F.
Brodley and Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:  Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88
GEO. L. J. 2239 (2000).
142 See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley & George Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic
Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981); Avinash
Dixit, Entry and Exit Decisions Under Uncertainty, 97 J. POL. ECON. 620, 620-38 (1989);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(1981); Paul Joskow & Alvin Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. &
ECON. 289 (1980); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry
Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing
and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 ECONOMETRICA 443
(1982); Janusz Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION vol. 1, at 537-96 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
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False Conviction Costs
False convictions occur when a firm is convicted under the Sherman Act
when its actions were reasonable in the sense already defined.  For purposes
of Section 1, we could provide a theory of reasonable price-fixing but this is
unnecessary.143  It should suffice to say that the reasonableness standard
would make some allowance for reasonable price-fixing, and probably more
than the law currently allows.144  The law already, as we have noted, creates
exceptions to the per se rule for certain cases (for instance, the introduction
of a new product, as in BMI).  In determining the costs of false convictions,
we must ask whether the per se rule’s foreclosure of certain exceptions that
would be available under a general reasonableness test generates substantial
overdeterrence costs.
Under Section 2, false convictions generate overdeterrence costs of
several forms, depending on the type of monopolization claim.  Consider,
again, the preemptive expansion claims upheld in the Alcoa opinion.  False
convictions for capacity expansion deter dominant firms from making
aggressive efforts to expand into new markets or to meet increases in
demand for their products.  In the latter case, if the firm is dominant in an
industry with economies of scale, a decision to forgo expansion would be
costly to the firm and to consumers.  Let us call this a simple production
efficiency cost.  In general, production efficiency costs result if false
convictions cause dominant firms whose costs are lower because of scale
economies to forgo aggressive expansion efforts.
Another type of overdeterrence cost is associated with false convictions
for predatory pricing.  Firms concerned about the risk of predatory pricing
charges will have an incentive to avoid aggressive price competition, which
diminishes the welfare of consumers by generating consumer surplus losses,
a cost we will call a price efficiency cost.
The error costs associated with false convictions for monopolization are
quite plausibly broader than the two basic types of overdeterrence costs
discussed so far—production efficiency and price efficiency costs.  False
convictions for monopolization, particularly predatory pricing, encourage
firms to seek informal agreements with their competitors.  The reason for
this is simple: if competitors have no complaints at all about a dominant
firm’s pricing or output decisions, they will have no incentive to seek
D. Willig eds., North-Holland 1989); Garth Saloner, Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete
Information, 18 RAND J. ECON. 165 (1987).
143 On “reasonable” price-fixing, see Grady, supra note 36; TELSER, supra note 36.
144 Grady, supra note 36.
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antitrust enforcement from the government.  Alternatively, if the
government or some third party should bring an antitrust action against a
dominant firm, one that has formed alliances with many of its competitors
will be able to rely on their support—e.g., testifying in court in favor of the
dominant firm’s conduct.  Thus, false convictions for monopolization have
a multiplier effect, creating cartelization costs, to the extent that they cause
informal collusive arrangements to develop.
Drawing an analogy to Guido Calabresi’s famous analysis of accident
costs,145 let us define the foregoing types of costs as the primary
overdeterrence costs associated with false convictions for monopolization.
The overdeterrence costs associated with false convictions under Section 2
are therefore production efficiency costs, price efficiency costs, and
cartelization costs.
In addition to these primary costs, we can identify a set of secondary
rent-seeking costs associated with false convictions for monopolization.
Secondary costs result from the law itself becoming a competitive
instrument, which is a problem largely unique to Section 2.  As a
competitive instrument, the law will be used to facilitate informal cartel
behavior among firms.  Firms that try to deviate from the implicit non-
competition norms encouraged by false convictions will be punished by
Section 2 lawsuits brought by firms that comply with the norms.  Thus, use
of the law as a facilitating mechanism for informal collusion generates a
distinguishable type of cost—facilitation costs—that results from firms
using the law to enforce non-competition norms.
Another distinguishable cost is connected to the distorted view that firms
are encouraged to have of the Section 2 standard.  As firms tend
increasingly to use it in order to facilitate informal cartelization, each firm
will tend to view the law as serving largely that purpose in the hands of
plaintiffs.  This leads potential defendants to have less regard for the
standards of the law itself, which should distort their compliance efforts,
again toward informal cartelization.  In other words, use of the Section 2
standard as a competitive instrument encourages demoralization costs to the
extent that reputational concerns and a belief that compliance with a
reasonable conduct rule will be rewarded are diminished as incentives to
avoid cartelization.
Finally, false convictions for monopolization generate tertiary litigation
costs connected to bad faith litigation.  Litigation is costly by itself.
However, these costs are likely to multiply as a result of the facilitation and
demoralization effects just described.  As a larger number of firms use the
145 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1970).
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monopolization lawsuit as a competitive tool, firms will find it increasingly
difficult to tell whether damages are awarded appropriately in the typical
case.  As firms lose faith in the ability of courts to distinguish valid from
invalid monopolization claims, their incentive increases to bring spurious
monopolization claims.146  Indeed, competition would spur firms to file
spurious claims since the firm that forbears from filing such claims would
be at a competitive disadvantage.147
One can draw an analogy here to tax cheating and bribery.  As long as
the expected penalty for tax cheating—the product of the probability of
detection and the penalty—is less than the immediate gain, competition will
spur firms to cheat on their taxes; for the firm that forbears from such
cheating will be undersold by its nefarious rivals.  Similarly, the firm that
refuses to bribe government functionaries in a corrupt country will suffer a
competitive disadvantage relative to its rivals.148  In the same sense, if there
is a substantial probability that a false conviction for monopolization will
occur, each firm will have an incentive to file a  spurious claim against a
dominant competitor as long as the expected gain—in terms of deterring the
competitive conduct of the dominant firm—exceeds the cost of bringing
suit.  We should expect this incentive to increase as the perceived
probability of a false conviction increases.  The logical endpoint of this
process is a state in which each firm has an incentive to seek damages from
a competitor after any event that causes a shift of business toward the
competitor.
Error Costs under Public Enforcement
We have focused on the incentives of private litigants.  However, many of
the error costs we have identified would be observed under a regime of
exclusively public enforcement.  Experience has shown that private parties
often have input, directly or through intermediaries, into the decisions of
146 Two notes are in order here.  First, in this context, we use “spurious” to indicate suits not
based on a reasonable belief that the defendant is imposing monopoly costs on consumers.
This certainly would include suits with negative expected value, but also (if errors are
sufficiently frequent and substantial) might include positive expected value suits as well.
Second, we are using the more complex, Bayesian notion of error referred to earlier (see text
accompanying note 95) in this discussion.  The simpler error rate (the likelihood of judicial
error) may be fixed at a low level, but industry players will observe the empirical (ex post)
frequency of false convictions (which is a function both of error and of the mix of guilty and
innocent defendants) and base their views of the operative legal standard on this measure.
147 This is true even if the suits have negative expected value in the ordinary sense so long as
the costs associated with defending the litigation sufficiently reduce competition to
compensate for the plaintiff’s expected litigation costs.
148 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Corruption, 105 Q. J. ECON. 599 (1993).
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the federal antitrust enforcers (the FTC and Justice Department).149  Indeed,
in any regime in which public antitrust enforcers have discretion, it is
difficult to see how private influence could be eliminated.
Although the incidence of litigation would not be entirely within private
litigants’ control, much of the preceding analysis would apply in a public
enforcement regime.  The primary overdeterrence costs (productive
efficiency costs and price efficiency costs) would remain, of course,
because these are due simply to the existence of a positive probability of
false conviction.  The magnitude of the costs will be affected by the
probability of false conviction, which in turn would be a function of the
cases brought.150 As a first approximation, we would expect public
enforcement to be more in line with the public interest in case selection,
though as we show momentarily that expectation will not necessarily hold
up.
The secondary costs that reflect rent-seeking pressures are likely to
remain in some form as well.  Although it is true that public enforcers will
not respond immediately to and in perfect conformance with the wishes of
private parties, they are likely to respond at least partially.151  Moreover,
even though the response of public enforcers will be muted and partial,
public enforcement agencies have the advantage of a relatively large budget
that can be spent without an immediate concern for the financial payoff.152
Public enforcers’ greater freedom from direct concern about litigation
costs—which provides some likelihood that a public enforcement agency
will pursue an “unremunerative” claim through the courts—also gives
private parties an incentive to lobby for public enforcement rather than
litigate on their own claims.  Indeed, a superior strategy is to pursue both: to
persuade the public enforcement agency to pursue an aggressive
monopolization claim first, and then follow with a private suit for treble
149 See, e.g., THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William D. Shugart eds., Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press 1995).
150  See discussion of the error probability accompanying note 95.
151  Public enforcers with different political allegiances will respond differently to pleas from
specific private parties.  That will affect the precise contours of public response to rent-
seeking and perhaps even the magnitude of rents generated through this response.  However,
public action under any regime will be likely to support some rent-seeking, as that will be the
dominant source of demands for public action.
152 Public enforcers do, of course, face budget constraints, and they must be concerned about
the costs and prospects for litigation. But that concern is not so immediate and direct as the
concern of private litigants, and this suggests private parties will seek to influence public
prosecutors.  In general, of course, it is not possible to know whether public enforcers will
bring more or fewer suits than private litigants or will seek enforcement in more or fewer low-
probability cases.
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damages if the public enforcement agent is successful.153  Given this
possibility, secondary rent-seeking costs associated with public
enforcement may be even larger than those created under a purely private
enforcement regime.  The same analysis raises the possibility that aggregate
litigation costs will be larger under a mixed public-private regime than
under a regime of strictly private litigation.
D. Understanding Antitrust Standards
This framework for error cost analysis can be applied to the two important
deviations from a reasonable conduct/general intent standard observed in
antitrust: the specific intent requirement under Section 2, and the per se rule
under Section 1.
Specific Intent Requirement
From the foregoing, the justification for the specific intent standard under
Section 2 should be clear.  The alternative to a specific intent requirement
under Section 2 is the standard articulated by Judge Hand in Alcoa: a
reasonable conduct standard coupled with a requirement of only general
intent evidence.  However, the modern Section 2 case law applies a
reasonable conduct standard with a requirement of specific intent evidence.
This effectively constrains courts to hold dominant firms liable under
Section 2 only when the sole (or overwhelming) purpose or motive behind
their conduct is to monopolize or create barriers to competition.  In other
words, the requirement of specific intent implies that a dominant firm does
not violate Section 2 when it’s actions can be characterized as a mixed sort
involving the creation of competition barriers and benefits for consumers.
Let us refer to the reasonable conduct standard coupled with a general
intent test as the Alcoa standard, and let us refer to the reasonable conduct
standard coupled with a specific intent test as the actual standard under
Section 2.  Relative to an extremely accurate court (one in which mistakes
are rare), the Alcoa standard involves a high likelihood of both false
convictions and false acquittals—that is, it generates a symmetric increase
in error.  For example, if courts attempt to determine whether capacity
expansion decisions were warranted by business conditions, many errors in
favor the defendant and in favor the plaintiff are likely.  The actual
standard, compared to a low-error regime, implies a decrease in the
likelihood of false convictions and an increase in the likelihood of false
153 See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, The Antitrust Industry, 68 GEO. L.J. 1053, 1065 (1980).
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acquittals.  The specific intent test implies an asymmetric increase in error
favoring defendants.
The case for the specific intent test is straightforward.  Under the Alcoa
standard, both false convictions and false acquittals are likely to occur.
Under the actual standard, false acquittals are likely and false convictions
unlikely.  If the costs associated with false convictions and false acquittals
were of equal magnitude, there would be little reason to choose one rule
over another.  However, the error costs are not of equal magnitude.  False
acquittal costs are likely smaller than those associated with false
convictions.
The reason false acquittal costs are likely to be smaller than false
conviction costs under Section 2 follows from a comparison of market
restraints and rent-seeking costs.  Market restraints due to entry,
competition from incumbents, and strategic behavior of market participants
are likely to keep the costs of false acquittals under Section 2 relatively
small.  False acquittal costs will be high only where the defendant has a
durable monopoly, protected against entry, and does not fear further
litigation costs from exploiting the monopoly.154  On the other hand, false
convictions under Section 2 are not constrained by similar factors.  The
threat of entry as a constraining force on cartelization is weakened under a
false-convictions regime because incumbent firms can use the
monopolization lawsuit as an instrument to restrain the competitive efforts
of an entrant.
A rough, static sense of the comparative magnitudes of false acquittal
and false conviction costs is suggested by Arnold Harberger’s analysis of
the deadweight cost of monopoly,155 and Gordon Tullock’s analysis of the
rent-seeking costs of monopoly.156  Recall that false acquittal costs under
Section 2 are consumer (and producer) surplus losses that result from
monopoly pricing.  Harberger’s and several succeeding empirical analyses
have suggested that these costs are relatively small, given the degree of
competition that typically exists.157  Harberger’s results suggest that among
potential antitrust defendants who have monopoly power and have
154 See discussion supra, text at notes 133-136.
155 Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 77 (May
1954).
156 Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 WESTERN ECON.
J. 224 (June 1967).
157 Harberger, supra note 155.  For the studies supporting Harberger’s results, see David
Schwartzman, The Burden of Monopoly, J. POL. ECON. 627 (1960); Dean A. Worcester, Jr.,
New Estimates of the Welfare Loss to Monopoly, 40 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 234 (1973); John J.
Siegfried & Thomas K. Tiemann, The Welfare Costs of Monopoly: An Inter-Industry
Analysis, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 190 (1974).
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exercised it illicitly (necessary aspects of a false acquittal), the instances in
which such power is both durable and substantial will be rare.   On the
other hand, false conviction costs are probably dominated by rent-seeking
costs, which can be approximated under Tullock’s analysis by the expected
profits from monopolization.  Where false acquittal costs principally
involve the dead-weight cost of a monopoly that is unchecked, false
conviction costs include the total cost of unproductive expenditures made in
pursuit of monopoly gains.158  In other words, while false acquittal costs can
be represented by Harberger triangles, false conviction costs are given by
Tullockian rectangles.  Thus in a static sense the error costs associated with
false convictions are likely to be greater than those associated with false
acquittals for monopolization.
A dynamic view of the regime further supports the concern over false
conviction costs, as the divergence in error costs is likely to increase over
time.  Changes in technology and tastes open new opportunities for firms to
enter and steal business from dominant firms.  Transportation and
communication costs fall over time, enabling firms in formerly distinct
markets to compete.  These factors reduce the costs of false acquittals—the
costs of monopolization—toward zero in the long run; that is at least the
historical tendency of entry, competition, and technological change.159  On
the other hand, where false convictions are frequent, monopolization costs
are likely to “ratchet up” over time.  The prospect of false convictions not
only deters vigorous competition but also provides non-competing firms an
effective tool—the attempted monopolization lawsuit—to constrain
158 Rent-seeking will not be a one-way street.  Potential defendants as well as potential
beneficiaries of antitrust litigation will make “directly unproductive” expenditures aimed at
influencing public authorities.  So far as potential defendants’ expenditures contribute to false
acquittal or to non-prosecution these impose costs that are in some respects similar to
competitors’ expenditures in pursuit of convictions (though constrained by the market
restraints identified earlier in this paper).  Not all of the lobbying expenditures by potential
defendants, however, should be classified as false-acquittal costs.  Apart from the fact that
some proportion of expenditures for both potential defendants and potential beneficiaries of
antitrust litigation will be congruent with social good, defendants’ expenditures aimed at
influencing public decision-makers are likely to increase along with the prospect of false
conviction.  See Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Organization, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987); Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction
and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73
(1991).  Moreover, since defendants will have an incentive to match the lobbying efforts of
potential plaintiffs, directly-unproductive expenditures are considerably more likely to be
spiral upward under the false convictions regime.
159 See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 188-239 (1977) (discussing economic impact of transportation and
communication revolutions of the nineteenth century).
 56 ANTITRUST INTENT [JULY]
competition from non-cooperating incumbents and potentially successful
entrants.160
The best analogy to the likely outcome of a regime with substantial
numbers of false convictions is suggested by the regulation of taxicabs.
Under medallion regimes, incumbent taxicab firms have an incentive to
prevent entry from new competitors, and seek to prevent entry by lobbying
municipal governments to enforce taxi regulations.  Moreover, incumbent
firms have typically made heavy investments based on their expectations of
retaining some degree of monopoly power, and understand that
maintenance of entry restrictions is necessary if the firms are to break even
on their investments.161  A similar scenario is likely to be observed in a
regime of false convictions for monopolization.  Firms that have made
investments based on the expectation that entrants would not take business
from them would have incentives to use the monopolization lawsuit in order
to protect their investments.162
In view of this, the specific intent standard probably serves the function
of reducing expected error costs associated with the reasonable conduct rule
under Section 2 by helping eliminate false convictions.  Again, in an ideal,
error-free world, the Alcoa standard (general intent coupled with
reasonableness test) could be applied in a manner that maximizes social
welfare.  However, in a regime in which mistakes are likely to occur, the
Alcoa standard is likely to perform poorly.
In addition to providing a positive theory of the specific intent test, error-
cost analysis provides suggestions as to the specific form of the test.  An
intent inquiry can be framed either as a subjective or as an objective
160 To be sure, there will be market pressures to reduce costs through development of
substitutes to goods or services whose efficient provision is constrained by fear of litigation.
But these mitigating factors do not alter the fundamental problem, that the false-convictions
regime encourages unproductive rent-seeking investments.
161 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER & JACK M. BEERMANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1021-22 (New York: Aspen Law & Business 1998); Edmund W. Kitch, Marc Isaacson &
Daniel Kasper, The Regulation of Taxicabs in Chicago, 14 J.L. & ECON. 285 (1971).
162  One might ask why these are not sunk costs, in the sense that the firms have incurred them
in the past, and should no longer take them into account in making decisions.  But when firms
have made investments in securing a legal framework that protects them from competition,
their future profits depend on the maintenance of their protective framework.  Hence, they
will have an incentive to continue to invest in the maintenance of a legally protective
framework.  To take a more concrete example, return to the example of taxicab medallions.
The medallion is an asset—the most important assets owned by taxi drivers and companies—
whose value is substantially determined by the degree of protection from competition.  The
market value of the medallion is the presented discounted value of the stream of profits
accruing to the medallion owner.  Medallion owners know that future protection from entry
increases the expected future stream of profits, and also the current value of the medallion.
See CASS, DIVER & BEERMANN, supra note 161, at 1021-22.
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inquiry.  Under a subjective inquiry, specific intent could be established by
evidence suggesting that the defendant had a desire to gain monopoly
power or restrict competition.  Thus, a defendant could be found in
violation of Section 2 even though his conduct provided substantial benefits
to consumers as long as the plaintiff could show that he really wanted to
gain monopoly power.  Corporate memoranda with statements such as
“we’ll destroy our competitors with this new product enhancement,” would
be indicators of specific intent under a subjective inquiry.
Under an objective inquiry, specific intent is inferred largely from
evidence negating the likelihood of any other motives.  Thus, under an
objective inquiry, a defendant whose actions produce benefits to consumers
in addition to potential barriers to competition would be an unlikely
candidate for a specific intent finding.
We doubt whether a subjective intent test can be applied in a predictable
fashion in a field such as antitrust, where all defendants seek to increase
profits, typically through strategies that require a gain in market share.
Given the difficulty of drawing distinctions on the basis of subjective
intent, such a test is likely to operate in effect as a randomly applied strict
liability rule.  If the subjective intent is inferred largely from statements of
business strategy under ordinary civil proof standards, the overdeterrence
costs associated with false convictions should be at least as large in this
regime as under the reasonable conduct standard.163
Per Se Rule
The foregoing analysis would seem to suggest that the per se rule against
price-fixing should be abandoned in favor of a reasonable conduct test.
False acquittal costs under Section 1 are, like those under Section 2,
constrained by the threat of entry, competition from incumbent firms, and
strategic behavior by consumers.  If false acquittal costs were the most
important components of an error-cost analysis, this would be the
unavoidable conclusion.  But this is an incomplete analysis.
Though false acquittal costs are constrained both under Section 1 and
under Section 2 by market forces, false conviction costs are subject to
different pressures under the two provisions.  The key difference is that the
rent-seeking costs generated by the prospect of false-convictions under
Section 2 are not observed in similar measure under Section 1.  Firms
would not have incentives to use Section 1 as a competitive tool in the same
163 Of course, various alterations of the subjective intent test—such as specifying a more
precise and limited object for the intent requirement or raising the evidentiary bar—could
reduce false convictions and overdeterrence costs. Such changes also could be made in other
intent tests.
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way as they might use Section 2.  Collusive behavior under Section 1 tends
to either include firms that otherwise might compete or to provide an
umbrella over less efficient competitors.  The victims who would bring suit
under Section 1 typically are not the competitors of the defendant, they are
suppliers or customers.164  In this capacity, they would have no interest in
using the Section 1 action as a tool for gaining a competitive advantage, nor
would they face competitive pressure to use Section 1 in this manner.
Moreover, while Section 2 (with false-convictions) can be used by an
incumbent firm to restrain competition from any substantial competitor,
Section 1 can be used (also with false-convictions) only against firms that
form a potentially-collusive group.  In addition, the scope for standing is so
much broader under Section 2 than under Section 1 that it is difficult to
imagine firms using Section 1 as competitive instrument.  The upshot is that
false conviction costs under Section 1 are not subject to the Tullockian rent-
seeking pressures observed under Section 2.
This is not to say that there will not be false-conviction costs under
Section 1, for there are several such costs under the current regime.  First,
the per se rule itself obviously generates false convictions, since a welfare-
maximizing, error-free regime would apply a reasonable conduct standard.
Of course, as we have noted before, the per se rule contains exceptions
(such as BMI), and in view of this the relevant question is whether the false-
convictions generated under the per se rule with its current exceptions are
substantial.  Second, public enforcement agents bring many of the Section 1
actions, and the incentives of these agents may diverge from those of
enforcer who is devoted to maximizing social welfare.  In particular, public
enforcement agents may have career interests that drive them to pursue
doubtful applications of the law.165  However, these costs are not fueled by
the same wellspring of self-interest as those generated under Section 2.
The other major difference between Section 1 and Section 2 is that while
competence (or the lack of it) would be a major factor generating error
under a reasonable conduct standard for Section 2, the private information
problem is probably the more serious source of error under a reasonable
conduct test for Section 1.  This is evident when viewed in light of the
164 Law firms specializing in class action litigation could engage in rent-seeking activities
even though consumers on whose behalf they (ostensibly) sue would not.  There is some
evidence of rent-seeking by such lawyers, though it appears targeted more generally to
preventing changes in the class-action litigation process than at securing government
cooperation in particular antitrust actions.  The reason for this may be the lawyers’ inability to
secure effective property rights in litigation ex ante in the same manner as competitors whose
status as parties in interest cannot be supplanted readily by other firms.
165 E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 82-87
(1969).
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history of price-fixing law.  Before the enactment of the Sherman Act, a
price-fixing issue entered the courts only on the occasion when a cartel
member refused to participate, and the other cartel members sued him on
breach of contract grounds.  Courts refused to enforce agreements to
restrain trade that they deemed unreasonable.  The courts applied a
reasonable conduct test to price-fixing and generated an elaborate doctrine
governing contract in restraint of trade.
If common law courts, well before the Sherman Act, were capable of
analyzing price-fixing claims, how could it be that courts would have such a
difficult time with similar claims after the passage of the Sherman Act?
The answer is that before the Sherman Act, courts confronted the price-
fixing issue only when one of the parties refused to participate.  In the
ensuing contract breach action, the parties in court were all extremely
knowledgeable of the reasons and motivations behind their agreement.  The
defendant could offer credible testimony as to whether the horizontal
agreement had economically-justifiable motives, or whether it was an effort
to gouge consumers.  In this setting, courts were given enough information
to assess the credibility of the alternative theories of price-fixing offered by
the plaintiff and defendant.
Under the Sherman Act, we have a different scenario.  Here we see a
public enforcement agent prosecuting a group of firms who have formed a
cartel.  Unless one of the members of the cartel discloses the true nature of
the agreement, the Sherman Act plaintiff and the court face an enormous
disadvantage.  The disadvantage is not attributable to the competence of the
court, it is attributable to the private information held by the cartel.  The
real reasons and motivations behind the horizontal conspiracy are known by
the cartel members, and they have a potentially decisive advantage in
obtaining and producing evidence to support their arguments.
Given that it is primarily private information held by defendants rather
than competence that generates error under Section 1, false acquittals must
be viewed as considerably more likely than false convictions.
Consequently, the expected costs of false acquittals under Section 1 should
be adjusted upward to reflect the private information problem.
Putting the pieces together, error-cost analysis suggests the arguments
favoring a high burden against plaintiffs under Section 2 do not suggest the
same burden under Section 1.  First, under a reasonable conduct standard,
false-convictions costs are likely to be smaller under Section 1 than under
Section 2.  Second, under the same standard, false acquittal costs are likely
to be higher under Section 1 than under Section 2.  These factors obviously
support the per se rule.
We have noted that the strict-conduct-plus-general-intent test that is
otherwise known as the per se rule has been relaxed in the two special cases
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of facilitating practices and conscious parallelism.  Courts have permitted
plaintiffs to prevail in some of these cases with only circumstantial
evidence—that is, with evidence falling short of proving general intent to
conspire with respect to price.  The analysis here shows that these special
cases should be understood as error-cost minimizing responses to the
private information problem.  Where the conditions indicate that the
likelihood of price-fixing is very high, courts have effectively shifted the
burden on general intent to the defendants.  When defendants have the
evidence in their hands, and the circumstantial evidence indicates guilt,
shifting the burden reduces the likelihood of error by giving the informed
party an incentive to reveal his information to the court.  In this sense, the
special and rather narrow exceptions created for plaintiffs in facilitating
practice and conscious parallelism cases are analogous to the res ipsa rule
in tort law, which shifts the burden of proof to the tort defendant in cases
where the circumstantial evidence indicates negligence.166  It is not clear
that deterrence analysis can provide a compelling account for the per se rule
in antitrust.  A cartel can act in a manner that, from a social welfare
perspective, is unreasonable, as would occur where its horizontal agreement
is designed to generate monopoly profits and is able to do so.  But cartels
also can act reasonably from a social welfare perspective, engaging in
cooperative activity that enhances social welfare, see Grady, supra note 32.
Reasonable cartel behavior does not expose consumers to any special risks.
Common law courts for many years applied a reasonable conduct test to
166 Note that error-cost analysis provides a justification for the per se rule that would
otherwise be harder to construct under the traditional deterrence analysis used to justify strict
liability rules in tort law.  Under the traditional deterrence analysis in tort law, strict liability
is appropriate in some areas even if courts operate without error.  Under one version of
deterrence analysis, strict liability is applied in order to reduce the scale of activities when
shutting down an activity is a more effective way of reducing harm than controlling
instantaneous precaution, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 70.  Another version of
deterrence analysis holds that strict liability is applied in order to reduce the scale of activities
when the externalized costs associated with the activity are substantially greater than the
externalized benefits.  See Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 977 (1996).  This is true, for example, of blasting, which even if operated under
reasonable care is likely to impose substantial costs and only minor benefits on adjacent
landowners.
It is not clear that deterrence analysis can provide a compelling account for the per se
rule in antitrust. A cartel can act in a manner that, from a social welfare perspective, is
unreasonable, as would occur where its horizontal agreement is designed to generate
monopoly profits and is able to do so.  But cartels also can act reasonably from a social
welfare perspective, engaging in cooperative activity that enhances social welfare, see Grady,
supra note 32.  Reasonable cartel behavior does not expose consumers to any special risks.
Common law courts for many years applied a reasonable conduct test to horizontal
agreements, even while applying strict conduct tests to nuisances in the tort law.
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horizontal agreements, even while applying strict conduct tests to nuisances
in the tort law.
IV. The Controversy over Intent in Antitrust
As we noted earlier, definition of the intent standard has been controversial
in antitrust law, particularly in monopolization disputes.  A growing
number of scholars in the law and economics area have suggested that
intent should play no role at all in antitrust analysis, which is the position
that Judge Hand took in Alcoa.167  A minority of antitrust commentators
have argued, on the other extreme, that intent should be determined either
wholly or in part by a subjective inquiry.168
Perhaps the individual who best illustrates the controversy is Professor
Franklin Fisher, the lead economic expert for IBM during the litigation of
United States v. IBM and later the lead economic expert for the government
in the Microsoft litigation.  During the IBM litigation, Fisher perceptively
noted that the intent issue had taken on an unjustifiably large degree of
importance in antitrust litigation, and argued that it should be deemed
irrelevant under the monopolization standard.169  During the Microsoft case,
however, Fisher argued that memoranda and other internal communications
167 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945).  On the
case against intent, see A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose-Acre Farm, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396,
1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., holding that specific intent is immaterial in predatory
pricing cases); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983)
(Breyer, J., subjective intent irrelevant); see also, RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 190 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976) (Any doctrine that
relies on proof of intent is going to be applied erratically as best); Franklin M. Fisher,
Matsushita: Myth v. Analysis in the Economics of Predation, 64 CHI. KENT L. REV. 969, 969-
70 (1988); David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property
Law, 24 J. CORP. L. 485, 513 (1999); Michael C. Quinn, Predatory Pricing Strategies: The
Relevance of Intent under Antitrust, Unfair Competition, and Tort Law, 64 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 607 (1990).
168 Daniel Gifford, The Role of the Ninth Circuit in the Development of the Law of Attempt to
Monopolize, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1021-23 (1986) (arguing that subjective intent
resolves ambiguities surrounding defendant’s conduct); Will Wachs, The Microsoft Antitrust
Litigation: In the Name of Competition, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 485, 498-99 (1999) (Microsoft’s
conduct should be judged in light of the subjective intent evidence).  In William Inglis &
Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981)—a case
holding that subjective intent evidence is material— the 9th Circuit cites Richard Markovits
for the proposition that the “rational expectations of the monopolist” should be consulted in
order to help determine whether his conduct violates the Sherman Act, Inglis, 668 F.2d, at
1034.  However, it is unclear whether Markovits thought that rational expectations are
equivalent to subjective intent.  A firm’s rational expectations as to the outcome of an action
could easily differ from its subjective intent.
169 See, e.g., FISHER, MCGOWAN & GREENWOOD, supra note 3, at 272.
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from Microsoft officers and employees that could be read as suggesting an
anticompetitive intent supplied the critical evidence that Microsoft’s actions
were not competitive acts but instead were violations of Section 2.170
The Microsoft litigation serves to illustrate the problems that would be
generated under either of the two extreme approaches to intent (general
versus subjective) suggested by antitrust commentators.  As we suggested
in Part II of this paper, antitrust courts have for the most part avoided
reliance on the subjective intent test and moved increasingly toward
adopting a specific intent requirement under Section 2.  In other words, of
the three approaches to intent observed in the law; (1) general intent, (2)
specific intent determined  by a subjective inquiry, (3) specific intent
determined by an objective inquiry, courts have gravitated toward the
objective specific intent test.  The Microsoft litigation provides a good
illustration of the reasons for rejecting the alternatives to the objective
specific intent test.
A. General Intent and Microsoft
The case brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Microsoft
Corporation turns on Microsoft actions that generally had two effects: they
reduced the cost of consumer access to software features integrated into
Microsoft’s Windows operating system for personal computers, and at the
same time made it more difficult for competitors to compete with
Microsoft.  For example, Microsoft integrated its Internet Explorer Web-
browser technology into Windows rather than selling it solely on a stand-
alone basis.  That decision increased consumer access to browsing software
and reduced the cost of such software but it also cut into the profitability of
competitors’ efforts to sell software performing similar Web-browsing
functions.
The question for the courts is what standard should be applied in
evaluating the challenged actions.  Our focus below is not on the details or
the outcome of the Microsoft case, but on the general issue of the
appropriate legal test to be applied in this case and in others with similar
issues.
170 See Fisher Cross, supra note 2.  We do not intend our remarks to be understood as a
criticism of Professor Fisher. Indeed, that an economist of his caliber would take different
views of the intent issue in different cases should be taken as an indication of  the issue’s
complexity.  For Fisher’s own description of his views in the IBM and Microsoft cases, see
Franklin M. Fisher, The IBM and Microsoft Cases: What’s the Difference?, 90 AM. ECON.
REV. 180 (2000).
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The Argument for General Intent
Steve Salop and Craig Romaine urge that the question—in the Microsoft
litigation specifically and in other antitrust cases more generally—should
be answered by applying a general intent standard to a reasonable conduct
test. Salop and Romaine use their own error-cost analysis to support this
argument.  In their view, a specific intent requirement would lead to too
many errors in favor of defendants.  A reasonable conduct-plus-general
intent test, however, would give courts discretion, according to Salop and
Romaine, to trade off false conviction costs against false acquittal costs in a
manner that leads to the minimization of overall error costs.171
In several places in their analysis, Salop and Romaine refer to a simple
hypothetical to support their case for the reasonableness-plus-general intent
standard.  In the hypothetical, a dominant firm enhances its product.  The
product-enhancement, however, has the effect of making it more difficult
for rivals to compete.  As Salop and Romaine put this hypothetical
example:
[S]uppose the efficiency benefit involves improved performance of the product.
Suppose that it were known that the improved product performance has a value
to users of $5.  To make the example extreme in order to illustrate the differences
among alternative antitrust approaches, suppose further that the higher barriers to
competition [resulting from the product improvement] were known to allow the
monopolist to charge an additional $50.172
Salop and Romaine argue that in this hypothetical case the antitrust court
comparing the consumer benefits to the consumer harms should hold the
firm in violation of Section 2.  They assert that a reasonable conduct-general
intent test would allow courts to maximize consumer welfare and, thus, to
operate an antitrust regime with minimal error.
Error Costs of General Intent versus Specific Intent
Our argument has been the opposite of that put forward by Salop and
Romaine.  We have urged that in many circumstances denying courts
discretion will minimize overall error costs.  That has been the apparent
function of the specific intent test in antitrust law and in the common law
generally.  Salop and Romaine, however, believe that it is wiser to give
courts maximum discretion, so that they will be free to reach decisions that
171 Id.
172 Id. at 646.
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maximize consumer welfare.  The logical extreme of Salop and Romaine’s
argument would leave antitrust courts unconstrained by legal doctrine and
simply charged with the duty to maximize consumer welfare.173
The Salop and Romaine hypothetical properly puts the difference
between two standards in issue.  Under a specific intent requirement, there is
a substantial probability that the judge in their hypothetical would find that
the dominant firm did not violate Section 2.  The case for acquitting the
dominant firm would be greater, of course, if we changed the numbers so
that the new value to consumers is $20 and the price enhancement $30
instead of $5 and $50.  However, even in their hypothetical as stated, it is
not evident that the objective evidence indicates specific intent to harm
competition.   Specific intent is an appropriate finding when the evidence
suggests that harming competition is the most probable motivation behind
the dominant firm’s conduct.  However, in the Salop and Romaine
hypothetical, we do not have clear support for such a finding.  Unlike Aspen
Skiing or Lorain Journal, the Salop and Romaine case is not one in which
the dominant firm cannot put forward any credible efficiency justification
whatsoever for its conduct.
Their hypothetical, thus, puts the question of the error-cost-minimizing
standard.  Salop and Romaine argue that the proper standard is the one that
allows judges in each individual case to assess whether social costs net
positive or negative from the particular acts challenged under the antitrust
laws.  The general intent standard would allow that; the specific intent
standard would not. That does not mean that the specific intent standard
would prevent courts in fact from deciding cases in line with social welfare,
much less that the specific intent standard would produce overall results
further from social welfare.  We believe that the opposite is the case.
The difference is our evaluation of the likelihood that courts will err in
making these determinations, that litigation will be used strategically more
often under the general intent standard, and that the constraints imposed by
market forces will limit the ill effects of acquittals more than they will of
convictions.  Returning to the analysis of our previous section, we know that
acquittal costs in antitrust monopolization cases are constrained by the
threat of entry from new firms, competition from incumbents, and strategic
responses of consumers.
173 Although readers might take the point to be a mere rhetorical exercise—the reductio ad
absurdum of a moderate position—academic legal scholars often suggest commitment of a
similarly radical discretion to courts, especially in the arena of constitutional adjudication.
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 98-99 (Cambridge: Belknap
Press 1991); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703 (1975); MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1982).
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Consider first the strategic responses of consumers.  In the Salop and
Romaine hypothetical a dominant firm—let us assume it is a software
firm—enhances its software in a manner that produces a benefit of $5, and
raises its price by $50.  What would a rational consumer do?  The consumer
has several options.  The most obvious is to stick with the old version of the
software.  After all, the old version is inferior in terms of value by only $5,
and cheaper by $50.  Because the “consumer surplus,” the gap between
value and price, is $45 greater for the old version, the old version is
economically superior to the new.  In a market in which all consumers are
informed and rational, they will stick with the economically superior
product rather than purchase an inferior new version.
One of the constraints software makers face is the durability of their own
products.  Generally, product durability is a constraining factor for firms
with monopoly power.  According to the famous “Coase conjecture,” a
monopolist who produces a highly durable product will be forced, in a
sense, to charge the competitive price.174  With a durable product, consumers
have the option of waiting until the monopolist can sell only to low-valuing
customers.  Knowing that the monopolist would prefer to make those sales
rather than forgo them, consumers will wait, forcing the monopolist to lower
its price to the competitive level.175
The Salop and Romaine hypothetical is one in which the cost of waiting
is not simply low; it is negative—consumers should find it highly beneficial
to wait, given that the old version of the product is superior.  At a minimum,
if consumers are rational they will not rush to the store to purchase the new
product unless the net benefits of switching to the new version are positive.
The test here is not simply whether the new product is in some way more
valuable than the old product standing alone.  The gain from switching to
the new version must exceed the sum of the price of the new version and the
costs incurred in learning how to use it.  This calculation must include the
loss of benefits from investments previously made in mastering the old
version.176  Given the benefits of waiting (or credibly threatening to wait),
174 Ronald H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 1 J.L. & ECON. 143 (1972).  See also Jeremy
Bulow, Durable-Goods Monopolists, 90 J. POL. ECON. 314 (1982); John Shepard Wiley, Jr.,
Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693 (1990).
175 But see John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer, Naked Exclusion,
81 AM. ECON. REV. 1137 (1991) (suggesting that under certain conditions it is possible for
the leasing monopolist to charge supra-competitive prices).
176 Of course, someone who is new to the product group will have less to gain from the prior
version—having nothing to gain from prior investments in mastering it—and, thus, might find
it advantageous to shift when someone earlier to the product group would not.  Apart from the
effect of network externalities, discussed below, this is not a significant fact.  It should not
affect the actions of other consumers.  They still benefit from passing up the new product,
waiting for a product that is higher in benefit or lower in price or both.
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consumers will also demand that the new product’s benefits exceed the
gains they forgo by not waiting.
Another factor constraining false acquittals is competition from
incumbent firms in the market.  Beyond the immediate term, the decision
modeled in the Salop and Romaine hypothetical will produce supply market
changes that provide additional alternatives to consumers.  The dominant
firm’s decision to charge a premium of $45 over the added consumer value
of its new software is an open invitation for competing firms to offer
consumers an economically superior product.  Unless the dominant firm in
their hypothetical is insulated from competition to a degree rarely seen in
mature markets such as that for software, gouging its customers will erode
its market over time.
The third factor constraining false acquittal costs is entry.  Some
commentary suggests that entry is difficult in the software industry, as firms
must incur significant costs up-front in design, production, and marketing.177
Large up-front investment often is described as constituting a “barrier to
entry” into an industry.178  Whether the need for such investment, however,
in fact discourages entry depends on the magnitude of the up-front costs in
relation to the potential gains from successful entry and on the availability
of financing to support investment.  With well-functioning capital markets,
even risky ventures requiring up-front investment will be undertaken if the
expected return is sufficient to justify it.  That is true even if the venture is
unlikely to turn a profit for some time, as is quite evident today with the
explosion in new internet-based firms.  It seems improbable that the
software industry, built more around brainpower than around large factories
and expensive physical components, would have difficulty attracting
entrants when entry is economically justified.
If a dominant firm charges a large premium for a new product, as Salop
and Romaine hypothesize, and if incumbent firms cannot provide suitable
alternatives, there is ample room for consumers and potential entrants to
make common cause.  Consumers—or intermediaries who serve their
interests, where consumers are too numerous and have individual interests in
the product that are too small for individual bargaining their
intermediaries—have incentives to provide guarantees to entrants who can
177 See, e.g., Teague I. Donahey, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Using the Essential Facilities
Doctrine to Ensure Accessibility to Internet Software Standards, 25 AIPLA Q. J. 277, 298
(1997) (“For example, to create from scratch a new browser-based operating system that
could compete with Microsoft or Netscape, it would require unusual and significant technical
expertise, as well as substantial time and money.”)
178 JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 144-66 (1956); A. Michael Spence, Entry, Capacity,
Investment, and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 534, 542 (1977).
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supply a superior product.   A large firm, for example, may be able to
distribute such large quantities of software internally that it could support an
entrant who offers a product superior to that of the dominant firm.179  Or a
firm might produce a product to which the software is complementary, and
thus have a special incentive to support development of a superior
alternative.180
The Role of Network Externalities
Before finally rejecting the general intent standard promoted by Salop and
Romaine, we should consider an argument pressed by proponents of using
antitrust law to regularize competition in the software industry: that the
costs of false acquittals are especially high where firms benefit from
network effects (or externalities).181  The argument relies on the proposition
that in such settings consumers do not behave in quite the same way as they
do in other settings, so that in the Salop and Romaine hypothetical, for
instance, consumers may switch to the new version even though it is
economically inferior.182  If, because of network externalities, consumers are
“locked in” to the dominant brand, false acquittal costs are likely to be
relatively high and perhaps unconstrained by market pressures.  If the
network “lock-in” theory were valid, it obviously would tilt our analysis in
favor of the general intent standard.  However, we do not think the theory is
valid.
Network externalities are, roughly, benefits consumers enjoy because the
product is used widely.  Take a software product that facilitates
communication (or file sharing) between users.  Because of the large base of
customers, users know that they can communicate easily with other users of
179 Again, recall the example from Barry Wright, discussed supra note 139, in which the
defendant incurred substantial expenses in supporting the plaintiff’s entry into the market,
solely for the purpose of creating an alternative source of supply.
180 The large number of firms in the software industry and the constant emergence of new
firms supports the view that economically justified entry—entry by firms that can produce
software that performs competitively with incumbent software at cost competitive with the
price charged by incumbent firms—is likely.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse  Coopers, 1999
Software Business Practices Survey, available at <http://pwcsoft.-com/pwcsoft/vcpract.htm>.
181 On network effects and antitrust, see, e.g., David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A
Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 36; Salop &
Romaine, supra note 3; David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to
Promote Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523 (1999); Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity
in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673 (1999).
182 For a rigorous exploration of the implications of this assumption, see Joseph Farrell &
Michael Katz, The Effects of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law on Compatibility and
Innovation, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 609 (1998).
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the same software.  If the value of such communication is high enough, the
number of other users becomes a critical determinant in consumer choice.
Thus, if each consumer thinks that most other consumers will switch to the
new version in the Salop and Romaine hypothetical, they may all switch to
the new version even though it is economically inferior to the old.
Switching to the new version is rational in order to avoid network exclusion
costs.
There are several empirical issues raised by this theory.  Network effects
do, of course, exist; they explain a great deal of the tendency of one
technical standard to dominate in many technologies, including those critical
to widespread use of computers.183  But it is doubtful that they would cause
rational consumers to choose economically inferior products—for example,
to spend an additional $50 on a product that has a marginal value of only
$5.184   This wrinkle on the network effects argument lends weight to the
concerns of the network effects theorists.  However, on inspection it turns
out to be the same as the basic network effects case.  In a market without
special impediments to dissemination of information (and no one has
suggested that there is a problem getting information about the software
market), newcomers will know that current users have no reason to switch to
the new version of the software in question.  If there are substantial network
effects, the newcomers will demand to be provided the older version of the
software.  That is especially likely if there is a very large group of current
users.  If there are relatively few current users and many newcomers, the
network effects could work in the other direction.  But that would be a
setting quite different from what Salop and Romaine postulate; it would be a
setting in which the typical user found the new software economically
advantageous, not dramatically disadvantageous.  Even in this setting, the
current users would not switch unless the benefits, include network effect
benefits, dominate the costs.  And, if the gap between network-independent
183 See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 181.
184 Suppose we have two groups of consumers: current users and newcomers, and users of
current software have a disincentive to switch not shared by consumers who are newcomers to
the market.  In this case, the newcomers might be inclined to purchase new software that has
net costs to current users.  That is, the product in the Salop-Romaine hypothetical might have
a net economic cost to users of the current version of this software but a net economic benefit
to newcomers.  If that is so, current users must take account of the benefit they derive from
being on the same system as the newcomers.  This benefit could be enough to induce them to
switch even if changing to the new software did not make economic sense apart from the
expected actions of other consumers.  This might be especially plausible in a case where
current user demands are heavily affected by their expectations regarding the choices of
newcomers.
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value and price is so large as in the Salop and Romaine hypothetical, it is
unlikely that consumers would either expect other consumers to flock to the
new version or gain enough value to raise their own utility past the increased
price.
The empirical evidence suggests that consumer decisions are not so
strongly influenced by network effects.  Leibowitz and Margolis have found
that consumer software purchases can be explained largely by quality (as
defined by the assessments of experts) rather than the herding behavior
induced by network externalities.185  They find that this result holds for a
considerable array of software products.186
Perhaps, however, network effects dominate consumer purchase decisions
in a segment of the software market.  The Microsoft litigation might be
characterized as involving the segment of that market—the platform
segment—that is most sensitive to network effects.  A software platform
contains application program interfaces (APIs), which allow other software
to use parts of the computer’s operating system to access files or to utilize
links to hardware such as printers.  Applications software (like word
processors, spreadsheets, and games) typically is written for a specific
software platform.  If network effects are much stronger for platform
software, does this alter our conclusion that the market will restrain the costs
of false acquittals?  In other words, if the Salop and Romaine hypothetical
expressly addressed Microsoft’s operating system, would market forces then
be beside the point?  We doubt it.
Even in the presence of strong network effects, market forces should
continue to constrain the costs of erroneous acquittals under Section 2.
After all, the consumer loyalty caused by network effects is, by hypothesis,
due to a rational belief on the part of consumers that present dominance
implies future dominance.  The network “lock-in” theory does not require
consumers to be irrational or uninformed as to the quality of the products on
the market; and if they were irrational or uninformed then network effects
would have only marginal relevance to the problem.  If consumers are
informed, then an incentive always remains for them to switch to a superior
product whenever they can avoid network exclusion costs.
And there are many ways to avoid network exclusion costs.  For example,
in the case of large employer, much of the communication relevant for an
employee’s work may take place inside of the firm.  In this case, if the
network exclusion costs are negligible, the firm should choose the superior
185 See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN MARGOLIS, WINNERS AND LOSERS AND MICROSOFT:
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (San Francisco: Independent Inst. 1999).
186 In addition to Web-browsing software, Liebowitz and Margolis examine competition in
word-processing, spreadsheet programs, personal finance software, desktop publishing
software, and online services.  Id. at 163-229.
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software product, or stick with the old version.187  Alternatively, in many
industries, virtually all of the interchange relevant for work takes place
among the firms in the industry, or a subset of these firms.  Consider, for
example, law professors.  Almost all of the collaboration to which network
effects are relevant involves other law professors, or other lawyers.  Law
professors or lawyers ought to be able at low cost to communicate with one
another about the quality of products relevant to their profession, including
the benefits of continuing to use an older version instead of a newer, but
economically inferior, version of software. Indeed, trade journals routinely
contain reviews of and advice about software relevant to lawyers’ work.188
The journals review specialty software (for tasks such as litigation
management) and general interest software (word-processing, spreadsheet,
and similar software), and they also inform readers about new versions of
platform software, reviewing various changes in operating systems.189
Communication about software, including platform software, can provide
excellent signals about the likely decisions of other professionals, and such
signaling can make the probability of globally irrational group decisions—
decisions driven by fear of the costs of network exclusion—arbitrarily small.
B. Microsoft, Reasonable Conduct, and Error Constraints
To this point we have suggested that the operating system software market is
no different from many other markets, in the sense that the threat of entry,
competition from rivals, and strategic actions of consumers all constrain the
power of dominant firms to exercise monopoly power.  The network effects
phenomenon introduces a feature that arguably requires a more careful
examination of error costs in the Microsoft case.  Kenneth J. Arrow’s
affidavit (on behalf of the Antitrust Division) in an earlier iteration of the
Microsoft litigation provides an excellent starting point for an analysis of
error costs:
187 In any choice of software, the firm will consider costs, such as retraining costs, that might
be reduced by following along with other firms’ software choices.  Retraining costs often are
underestimated by casual observers.  See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Copyright, Licensing and the
First Screen, 5 MICH. J. TELECOM. & TECH. 35 (1999).  In the short run, of course, there are
no retraining costs involved in staying with the current software.
188 See, e.g., LAW OFFICE COMPUTING (magazine reviewing, among other things, software for
lawyers, see Reviews section); LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT (Technology Update and
Product Watch sections in every issue).
189 See, e.g., DecisionQuest’s CaseSoft Division Releases CaseMap 2.5, 1 LAWYERS
COMPETITIVE EDGE, August, 1999, at 14 (litigation management software); G. Burgess
Allison, World-Class Innovation and Century-Class Headaches, 26 LAW PRACTICE
MANAGEMENT Jan.- Feb. 2000, at 14, 18-19 (software platform).
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[T]he software market is peculiarly characterized by increasing returns to
scale and therefore natural barriers to entry.  Large-scale operation is low-cost
operation and also conveys advantages to the buyer.  Virtually all the costs of
production are in the design of the software and therefore independent of the
amount sold, so that marginal costs are virtually zero.  There are also fixed
costs in the need to risk large amounts of capital and the costs associated with
developing a reputation as a quality supplier.  Further, there are network
externalities, in particular, the importance of an established product with a
large installed base and the related advantage of a product that is compatible
with complementary applications.
Installed base generally refers to the number of active users of a particular
software product.  A software product with a large installed base has several
advantages relative to a new entrant.  Consumers know that such a product is
likely to be supported by the vendor with upgrades and service.  Users of a
product with a large installed base are more likely to find that their products
are compatible with other products. . . . The value of an operating system is in
its capability to run application software.  The larger the installed base of a
particular operating system, the more likely it is that independent software
vendors will write programs that run on that operating system, and, in this
circular fashion, the more valuable the operating system will be to consumers. .
. .
It is correct that under strongly increasing returns, the tendency of the
market is towards monopoly . . . and it is certainly possible that the
monopolization is inefficient.  But notice that most of the steps in the dynamic
process leading to monopoly or imperfect competition are steps in which the
growth of the monopoly arises by offering a cheaper or superior product. . . .
The amici curiae brief notes that, “once a market is ‘tipped’ in favor of a
particular competitor, it would take truly massive forces to return the market to
a state of equilibrium (i.e., competition).”  There are two remarks to be made
here.  (1) Clearly, competition is not a state of equilibrium or at any rate of
stable equilibrium, . . . (2) “Truly massive” forces are very likely to impose
their own truly massive costs, which have to be weighed against the gain from
competition, which, under increasing re  turns, is sure to be inefficient, or from
“tipping” the equilibrium in the right direction, which is usually unknowable . .
. .
This is not to deny that a firm with a large installed base or other realization
of scale economies may sometimes be in a position to impose artificial
barriers, and these should be regulated or prohibited, . . . But interfering with
purely natural barriers to entry can be dangerous to the economy’s welfare.190
As the Arrow declaration makes clear, the phenomenon of scale
economies, or “increasing returns,” is central to the Microsoft case.
Professor Arrow suggests that it is important to distinguish the effects of
artificial and natural barriers to entry in an increasing-returns industry.  The
190 See Arrow declaration, available at <http://web.lawcrawler.com/microsoft/usdoj/-cases/>.
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natural barriers in the operating system software market are the factors
initially discussed by Arrow: up-front fixed costs and network externalities.
Artificial barriers are alleged as the basis of the complaints against
Microsoft: exclusionary contracts (contracts with computer makers and
Internet service providers) and product tying (tying the internet browser to
the operating system).
An additional problem, not discussed in Arrow’s declaration, is the
possibility that some artificial barriers may be socially desirable in an
industry with increasing returns.  Suppose, for example, A produces
hairbrushes and combs, and there are scale economies in the joint
production of both.  Suppose B produces only combs.  If A can fully exploit
scale economies, it can offer a combined package of combs and brushes
more cheaply than B or any other firm.  In this setting, A might want to offer
only the combination package, a move that commonly would be labeled as
product tying, an artificial barrier.  Here, that move may be socially
desirable.  Why?  Tying increases the likelihood that A will be able to
exploit economies of joint production.  Some consumers might buy combs
and brushes together even though they would have preferred (ceteris
paribus) to purchase only one or the other, leading to a decrease in consumer
welfare that must be offset against the gain that follows from A’s full
exploitation of the economies of joint production.191  Of course, if B or some
other firm can offer combs at a price consumers find attractive (enough
below the combined price for A’s combs and brushes to be worth forgoing
the tied purchase), then A will sell fewer combs and will not fully exploit
the benefits of joint production.
Let us reconsider our error cost analysis in this context.  To this point we
have argued that the general intent plus reasonable conduct test is inferior to
the specific intent test because the costs of false convictions are likely to be
relatively high and unconstrained under the general intent/reasonable
conduct test.  Does the presence of increasing returns, or natural barriers to
entry, require us to alter this conclusion?
Consider, first, the costs of false acquittals.  One should note immediately
that the definition of a false acquittal is more complicated now.  One could
argue that a false acquittal occurs whenever a defendant that has employed
artificial entry barriers escapes punishment.  This standard, however, would
be inappropriate from the vantage of social welfare, because it encompasses
the case in which the artificial barriers have a negligible impact (probably
191 On the use of tying to capture scale economies, see John L. Peterman, The International
Salt Case, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 351 (1979) (suggesting that International Salt’s policy of tying
salt to Lixators was efficient in the sense that it allowed the firm to reduce expenses of
distributing salt, through gaining scale economies in distribution).  But see Robin Cooper
Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079 (1999).
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less than any cost of policing it).  Suppose, for example, that both artificial
and natural barriers are present, but the difficulties experienced by rivals are
entirely attributable to the natural barriers.  In this case, the defendant would
not be found liable under a properly-functioning reasonable conduct
standard, because the critical requirement of causation is lacking.  A verdict
for defendant in these circumstances should not be deemed a false acquittal.
Under a proper definition of the reasonable conduct standard, a false
acquittal occurs only when the defendant has erected artificial barriers that
substantially diminish market competition.
There is another serious difficulty in applying a reasonable conduct
standard in the increasing-returns environment.  As we noted earlier, some
degree of artificial entry protection may be socially desirable when the
dominant firm is attempting to ensure full exploitation of scale economies in
production and marketing.  In the software market, recall, there are scale
economies in production and network externalities (a form of scale
economies) in consumption and in complementary product markets
(applications software).  The dominant firm may be the only actor in this
market whose gain from exploiting scale economies is sufficiently large to
make it worthwhile to invest the sums necessary to achieve such economies.
Under a proper reasonable conduct standard, the dominant firm would not
be found liable when the artificial barriers had no significant impact on
market competition, or when the artificial barriers were socially desirable in
light of the gains from exploiting scale economies.  A proper standard would
force us to confront the question: how much is too much?  In other words,
given that the reasonable conduct standard should make allowance for the
presence of some artificial barriers to entry, in the increasing-returns
context, when has the dominant firm gone too far in creating artificial
barriers?  Obviously, this question is hard to answer.  That task is at least as
difficult as determining whether, under Hand’s Alcoa standard, a dominant
firm has expanded its capacity in a preemptive or in a reasonable fashion.
It should be clear from this discussion that, because of the difficulty in
distinguishing the effects of artificial and natural barriers in the increasing -
returns setting, the likelihood of judicial error is substantial under a
reasonable conduct test.  Like the question of reasonable conduct in the
medical malpractice setting, or the issue of capacity expansion in Alcoa, the
reasonableness determination in a setting of increasing returns is very likely
to be beyond the competence of a court.
We can, however, more readily answer other questions.  Setting aside
whether a false acquittal has occurred, can we tell whether the cost of a false
acquittal is likely to be constrained by market pressures in the increasing
returns setting?  We can.  Although the threat of entry is weakened in this
setting, it remains a constraining force—it still helps put an outer limit on
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the costs of a false acquittal.  Suppose artificial barriers (such as tying) are
present and the natural barriers to entry are trivial (that is, the artificial
barriers have bite).  This would be the case where, say, the aspiring entrant
can produce at a lower cost than the dominant incumbent but the cost of
entry is high because of an artificial barrier erected by the incumbent firm.
The threat of entry remains a constraining force in this setting because the
aspiring entrant will incur the additional entry costs—will climb the
artificial barrier—if the anticipated gains from superior efficiency would
permit it to recoup the costs of entry.  The degree of constraint, of course,
depends on the size of the barrier, but if the potential entrant cannot offer a
significant efficiency advantage, there is no evident welfare gain from entry
or welfare loss from exclusion.192
Now let us turn to the costs of false convictions.  The relevant question is
whether these costs are unusually high in the increasing returns setting.  We
have identified the general types of false conviction costs as follows:
primary overdeterrence costs, secondary rent-seeking costs, and tertiary
litigation costs.  Primary overdeterrence costs consist generally of
production efficiency costs, price efficiency costs, and cartelization costs.
Without launching into a detailed accounting effort, it should be clear that
these costs are larger in the increasing-returns setting than in cases of
decreasing returns or constant returns.  In the increasing-returns setting, any
given price increase implies a loss in production efficiency and a further
price efficiency loss since the cost of producing each additional unit rises.
Cartelization costs are also apt to be larger.  This follows from the tendency
toward monopoly noted in the Arrow declaration, which suggests that the
number of firms in the industry will be smaller and the prospects for formal
or informal cartel arrangements greater.193  In the operating system software
market, these costs are present along with the efficiency costs associated
with reducing network effects.  Output restraints and price increases in this
special case reduce the network benefits to users and to application makers.
Yet another reason for concern over false convictions is that rent-seeking
costs are likely to be quite high in the increasing-returns setting.  The reason
is simple: every firm wants to be the winner.  Every firm, and every
192 This argument puts to one side the prospect of increased “x-inefficiency costs” to non-
entry.  X-inefficiency refers to the theory that when competition is weak, firms will tend to
tolerate a greater degree of incompetence and dilatory behavior from their workers.  On the
theory, see F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 667-672 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 3d ed. 1990).
193 As George Stigler noted, the relation of number of firms in an industry to degree of
competition in the industry is unproven, but a smaller number of firms reduces the costs of
cartelization (even if it does not reduce—and may even increase—the benefits of
competition).  See Stigler, supra note 133.
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consumer, gains ex ante from a regime that encourages full exploitation of
scale economies.  However, ex post, after the winner has emerged, every
loser prefers a regime in which he is the winner or in which the market is
shared in an oligopolistic structure.  This is true irrespective of the identities
of the losers and the winners.  The behavior of Microsoft’s main
competitors in the market for potential software platforms does not reveal
any essential quality that distinguishes the officers of those firms from the
officers of Microsoft.  Rather, their behavior is the predictable response of
firms that have (at least temporarily) lost the race for dominance in a market
with increasing returns and network effects.  For such firms, there is a nearly
irresistible incentive to contest the ultimate outcome.
The existence of natural barriers explains a large part—if not all— of the
incentive for unsuccessful or non-dominant firms to seek a regime in which
the market is more evenly shared.  Although there is a tendency toward
monopoly under increasing returns, we often see oligopolistic markets.  For
example, although railroads have high fixed costs relative to most industries,
railroads typically have an oligopolistic structure rather than a single
dominant firm. A sufficient explanation is that natural capacity constraints
make it difficult for one firm to displace all of its competitors.  The
existence of very high fixed and low marginal costs, however, make
vigorous price competition quite perilous for the financial health of the
firms.194  There is, hence, a strong incentive to arrive at an arrangement that
will secure for each of the firms a stable existence, relatively sheltered from
fierce competition.195  These arrangements can last a long time, but they are
unstable in the face of impediments to verifiable information on competitive
conduct.  For that reason, the efforts to maintain railroad cartels were no
more a feature of the industry than the collapse of the cartel arrangements.196
Much as it might explain about the structure of a particular increasing-
returns industry, the existence of natural barriers will not be the first
explanation offered by less successful competitors for their performance.
Given the difficulty of distinguishing the effects of natural and artificial
barriers, and the desire to gain a market advantage, each non-dominant firm
has an incentive to attribute the effects of natural barriers to the existence of
194 GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916, at 8 (Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1965).
195 This is at least part of the story behind regulation of railroads.  See KOLKO, supra note
194; Robert M. Spann & Edward W. Erickson, The Economics of Railroading: The
Beginning of Cartelization and Regulation, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCI. 227 (1970).
196 Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The
Standard Oil Case, 39 J. L & ECON. 1 (1996).  See also PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF REGULATION: THE TRUNK-LINE RAILROAD CARTELS AND THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION BEFORE 1900 (1965).
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artificial barriers.  Indeed, as in the tax-cheating and bribery examples
mentioned earlier,197 competition should induce every non-dominant firm to
mount such a challenge so long as the test applied has a substantial
probability of erroneous application – as is the case with the general
intent/reasonable conduct test in this context.
Finally, it should be clear that the administrative and litigation costs
associated with false convictions are likely to be unusually high in the
increasing returns setting.  The reasons follow from the foregoing
arguments.  The difficulty of distinguishing the effects of artificial and
natural barriers generates uncertainty, and uncertainty generates litigation.198
In addition to uncertainty, high stakes increase the prospect for litigation.199
High stakes are a standard feature of competition in increasing returns
settings.
Far from seeing increasing returns as a reason for altering the specific
intent requirement, we conclude that the case for such a change is especially
weak in the context of increasing returns.  As in the general case, the costs
of false acquittals continue to be restrained by competitive forces, but the
costs associated with false convictions are likely to be especially high in the
increasing returns setting.  Contrary to the suggestions of scholars such as
Salop and Romaine, the existence of increasing returns and network
externalities in the operating system software market do not suggest that a
reasonable conduct-plus-general intent standard would be preferable in
Microsoft and similar high-technology antitrust cases.  To the contrary, they
suggest that the specific intent test is strongly preferable.
C. Specific Intent, Subjectively Assessed
At this point, we can quickly dispose of the alternative standard recently
urged by Frank Fisher that would determine liability on the basis of
subjective intent evidence.  The subjective intent test divides the market
between firms that are legally sophisticated (or especially focused on
litigation rather than market competition) and unsophisticated firms (or
firms preoccupied with market competition and largely oblivious to the
importance of litigation as a strategic tool).  Legally sophisticated firms
know how to avoid leaving substantial amounts of discoverable evidence of
197 See discussion supra text at notes 147-148.
198 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 588-590 (5th ed. 1998).
199 If the stakes are high, then the plaintiff’s expected recovery is more likely to exceed his
litigation expenses, so he is more likely to sue.  Moreover, if plaintiff and defendant disagree
about the likely outcome of a trial, the likelihood of settlement declines as the stakes increase.
These points are clear implications of the settlement model elaborated in Shavell, supra note
105.
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subjective intent.  Unsophisticated firms are not aware of the importance of
watching their words.  The subjective intent test, thus, introduces a large
payoff for legal sophistication, or more generally, strategic sophistication in
a litigious environment.
The ultimate effect of the subjective intent test on plaintiff’s and
defendants’ success rates is not readily estimated.  Potential plaintiffs might
be worse off under the subjective intent test, since firms eventually would
gain the sophistication to avoid liability.  Of course, it is unlikely that every
firm would gain such a level of sophistication.  At the same time, subjective
intent to harm competition would be apt in many instances to be predicated
on internal documents that (as explained earlier) are far from compelling.
This, however, is likely to be the direct evidence of subjective intent that is
available.200  As firms grew more sophisticated, plaintiffs would respond
accordingly, arguing for a finding of specific intent at the first whiff, or
slightest suggestion, of bad intent.  The game, in other words, is
unpredictable, and the expected strategic responses are most likely to push
toward reliance on increasingly ambiguous evidence.
Although we cannot confidently predict the equilibrium of this game, our
first intuition is that the subjective intent test increases the risk of liability
to firms operating under it.  Under this assumption, the social costs
associated with the subjective intent standard are likely to be equivalent to
and perhaps larger than those associated with a general intent test.  The
reason is that the subjective intent test would operate effectively as a strict
liability standard, since every act that could be deemed anticompetitive,
whether or not it would be deemed so under a reasonable conduct standard,
could lead to a finding of liability under the Sherman Act.
The precise manner in which the social costs of a subjective intent test
are realized might depend on the type of defendant.  Among legally
unsophisticated potential defendants, false convictions probably would
happen more frequently under the subjective intent test than under the
general intent test.201  For legally sophisticated defendants, false convictions
200 Recognizing the importance of business records, Judge Frank Easterbrook criticized the
subjective intent approach for its meager contribution to judicial accuracy and its large
impact on litigation expenses, A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. 881 F.2d
1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Intent does not help to separate competition from attempted
monopolization and invites juries to penalize hard competition.  It also complicates litigation.
Lawyers rummage through business records seeking to discover tidbits that will sound
impressive (or aggressive) when read to a jury.  Traipsing through the warehouses of
business in search of misleading evidence both increases the cost of litigation and reduces the
accuracy of decisions.”)
201 And would false acquittals happen more frequently?  Probably not.  The subjective intent
test would most likely take the form of an “add on”, leading to liability in those cases where
 78 ANTITRUST INTENT [JULY]
might happen less frequently, but only because they had consulted their
lawyers before taking any action potentially harmful to competitors.  Both
types of equilibrium imply large social costs.  In the former, involving the
unsophisticated firms, the costs of false convictions would be large.  In the
latter, involving sophisticated firms, the overdeterrence costs would be
unusually large, in addition to the sheer administrative burden of having
lawyers involved in the formulation and negotiation of every competitive
action.  The two outcomes differ largely in the sense that the rent-seeking
and litigation costs are likely to be smaller in the equilibrium among
sophisticated firms.  But the savings in these costs would probably be more
than offset by greater overdeterrence costs.
Whether realized in the form of primary (overdeterrence), secondary
(rent-seeking), or tertiary (litigation) costs, we see no reason a priori to
believe that the social costs created by the subjective intent test are less
than those of the general intent test.  We have argued already that these
components of social cost are amplified in the increasing returns setting
characteristic of network markets.  The presence of network externalities
tilts the case against rather than in favor of the subjective intent test.
V. Extensions
The same sorts of judgments about error costs we observe in antitrust can
explain the shape of many legal rules.  In this section, we provide a few
illustrations.  These are not developed in great detail, but they indicate the
manner in which error cost analysis can illuminate the choices made in
framing legal rules.
A. Business Judgment Rule of Corporate Law
Error cost analysis provides a theory of the business judgment rule in
corporate law.  Under the business judgment rule, courts defer to the
judgment of the corporate officers when shareholders or creditors sue them
on the theory that they were negligent in managing the firm.  In order to
hold officers liable for negligence under the rule, plaintiffs typically have to
prove that the officer’s harm to the corporation was grossly negligent or
intentional.  The business judgment rule is operationally quite similar to the
Section 2 legal standard in the sense that it can be read as a reasonable
conduct rule requiring evidence of specific intent.
the conduct was ambiguous but the subjective bad intent present.  In a case where the
defendant’s conduct is unambiguously unreasonable, the court is unlikely to allow the
defendant to escape liability merely because his intent was benign.
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Since courts have no particular advantage in reviewing the business
decisions of corporate officers, one should assume that a reasonable
conduct rule with a general intent test would result in frequent errors, in
favor of plaintiffs and of defendants.  The likely result of these errors is
overdeterrence, since corporate officers would be reluctant to take actions
that might be near the threshold of reasonable conduct.
False acquittals occur when the corporate officer is found non-negligent
even though the expected harms to the corporation exceeded the expected
benefits of his conduct.  However, the costs of false acquittals for negligent
management will be constrained by market forces.  Managers who in good
faith frequently take actions that harm their corporations are likely to be
punished in several ways.  They will lose their jobs, their reputations will
suffer, the corporations they manage will fail.  In a competitive market for
corporate control, bad managers will be forced to exit, or to consistently
receive a return on their human capital investments well below what they
could receive in an alternative calling.
False conviction costs for negligent management obviously create
excessive deterrence against risk-taking by managers.  More important,
false convictions generate a form of rent seeking behavior as well.  The
parties who own the assets of a corporation can be divided into fixed
claimants and residual claimants; the former composed of fixed-salary
employees and creditors, and the latter composed of primarily of
shareholders.  Often these two classes of owner have opposing views on the
appropriateness of risk taking.  Fixed claimants usually prefer the firm to
follow conservative policies, while shareholders are willing to see the firm
take risky decisions.  A false convictions regime could generate a rent-
dissipating struggle between these classes of owner to gain control of
corporate officers.  Since corporate officers already owe their primary duty
to the shareholders, the fixed-claimants would have the clearest incentive to
use the courts in order to gain control over corporate decisions.
B. Specific Intent and Duty in Tort Law
While antitrust rules and corporate law rules affect rents over which parties
compete to gain control, there are many instances of rules that can be
explained by an error-cost analysis, that do not control the distribution of
rents.  Tort law contains many such rules, almost all of which come in the
form of modifications of the reasonable conduct standard.
As we have suggested earlier, specific intent requirements in the rules for
assault and defamation can be analyzed from an error-cost perspective.  In
both cases, error-free courts could, in theory, apply a reasonable conduct
standard in a manner that penalizes all socially undesirable conduct.
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However, the difficulty arises in these cases of determining the reasonable
conduct threshold.
One reason for the difficulty is reluctance to restrict socially beneficial
activity.  Expression, which is directly at issue in defamation and can be
implicated in assault cases as well, has long been understood to have
aspects of a public good.202  So, too, elements of assault are not readily
disentangled from socially beneficial interpersonal relations (including, at
times, an element of expressive activity).203
Given the difficulty of determining the reasonable conduct threshold for
assault and defamation, the specific intent test serves the function of
providing an alternative standard that provides the right incentives for
courts.  Courts are required under these standards to penalize conduct that
may be largely expressive only when the evidence indicates that the actor
intended to harm someone.  Cases of mixed motives, determined under an
objective test, are inappropriate for penalization under the rules in these
areas.  This approach minimizes the presumably large costs associated with
false convictions for expression.
An error-cost perspective also suggests a positive theory of the famous
and often-criticized “no-duty” rules in tort law, such as the rule governing
rescue and that governing the duties of a landowner to a trespasser.  Under
the rescue rule, an individual is generally immune from tort liability for
simply failing to rescue someone, even though the burden of rescue is
minimal.  However, a defendant may be held liable if he intentionally harms
the victim or acts with reckless disregard for the victim’s safety.  The same
rule applies as between a landowner and trespasser.  Both rules effectively
substitute a specific intent rule for the negligence test.
Many scholars have noted that a duty to rescue would create serious line-
drawing problems for courts because it would often be difficult to
determine which of several parties should be held responsible for failing to
rescue.204  Tort law generally assigns duties of care for activities that create
202  See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Boston: Ticknor & Fields 1863; orig. pub.
London 1859); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press 1982); Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Marketplace, 7
J.L. & ECON. 1, 3-10 (1964); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective,
20 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, 41-43 (1986).
203 Return to the example of Tuberville v. Savage, discussed supra note .  Or consider the
more extreme example of a feigned assassination attempt.  See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Words,
Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHIC. L. REV. 795, 836 (1993) (observing that “an attempted
assassination of the President may well qualify as speech,” while also noting that “it does not
raise anything like a free speech question . . . because government can invoke strong content-
neutral reasons for protecting the President’s life.”).
204 James A Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 928-43
(1987); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 21, § 56 at 373-385.
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foreseeable harm.205  A general duty to rescue, on the other hand, could not
be appended to a specific activity or a specific decision.  The range of
potential defendants and the difficulties of assessing the value of the
targeted (non-rescuing) action as compared to its risk of harm pose
enormous problems for structuring a rule with low error costs.  Those who
are not rescued (or their survivors) are unlikely to have information about
most of the potential rescuers, and courts are unlikely to be able to secure
enough of the private information about the activities of non-rescuers to
assess correctly the reasonableness of the non-rescue decision.  The rule,
thus, would be almost certain to be enforced selectively and with a
considerable degree of error.  Moreover, the rule is apt to generate
considerable administrative costs unless it is structured to minimize the
prospect that false convictions would advantage risk-taking activities by
potential plaintiffs.206
C. Intent in Constitutional Law
Constitutional law presents issues of intent analysis in several areas.
Consider the construction of the bill of attainder clause,207 the free speech
clause of the first amendment,208 and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.209  These provisions, respectively, prohibit
government actions that singles specific individuals out for punishment,
that discriminates against suspect classes, or that discriminates
unreasonably against disfavored speech.210  In each case, the constitutional
205 For the best known presentation of this view, see Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
206 And if the rule advantages risk-taking by potential plaintiffs, it will generate incentives
among those plaintiffs to litigate in order to maintain the advantage.  Thus, a  duty-to-rescue
could generate the same rent-seeking incentives as a nuisance rule protecting landowners
from aesthetic disturbances, see text accompanying notes 106-108.
207 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 473, 475-476, 478
(1977).
208 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 592 (1983).
209 See, e.g., Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 US. 256, 279 (1979).
210 As we explain below, the “reasonableness” determination in first amendment law is not a
simple, undifferentiated assessment of reasonableness.  Rather, the courts have created per se
rules (usually with exceptions) for some types of speech-regulative activity and have utilized
a modified reasonableness standard for other types (with burdens on the government in some
cases to justify the reasonableness of its actions and burdens on plaintiffs in other cases to
establish the unreasonableness of speech regulations).  See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils
of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1987); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles
of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482
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concern is not readily addressed by looking only at the express language of
a statute or at its effects.  And in each case, the courts have fashioned
specific intent tests to effectuate the constitutional interest.
The starting point in each provision is the instinct that government
officers cannot be trusted to serve public interests in certain settings where
their personal interests are engaged directly or where animus from a
politically-influential group distorts public action.211  Of course, personal
interest and group conflict are endemic to public governance.212
Constitutional processes are designed to limit the degree to which these
distortions from public interest place exceptional burdens on individuals.
The three provisions discussed here reflect intuitive concerns, probably
shared the Constitution’s framers, that particular actions would be unlikely
to be policed effectively by ordinary political processes, would impose
especially corrosive burdens on individuals, and could be addressed at
tolerable cost by a focused prohibition.213  These provisions are part of an
overall design to align government actions with public interest. The shape
given to these provisions through constitutional interpretation is sensitive to
error cost concerns.
(1975); Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment,  34
UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A
Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND L. REV. 265 (1981); Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).  Similarly, equal protection
analysis has fragmented into different tests for different contexts. See, e.g., Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (rationality test for non-suspect
classifications); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1983)(strict scrutiny standard of
review for race-based classifications); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(intermediate standard of review for gender-based classification).
211 See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); LEE BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press 1986); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1980); Vincent Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521; Ronald A. Cass,
Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317 (1988);
Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in the First Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761
(1986).
212 See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press 1959); THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, THE
CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1969).
213 Cf. DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 44 (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press 1984) (discussing Federalist 78 and limitations on legislative power like bills
of attainder, he states “Hamilton understands a limited Constitution to be one with ‘certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority’ rather than as one limited to a certain
specified enumeration of the legislative authority.”).  The view expressed by Epstein is
consistent with the notion that the three constitutional provisions discussed here make
surgical strikes at legislative authority at points where it is especially likely to depart from
general welfare interests.
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More specifically, in each of the three cases considered below, courts
have imposed a specific intent burden on plaintiffs who challenge facially-
neutral statutes or regulations.  In an ideal, error-free world, there would be
no need to examine intent.  Courts could apply a reasonableness test to
individual conduct and to legislation as well.  Under such a test, applied to
legislation, judges would have a power quite similar to that claimed by
Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull:214 to invalidate legislation as inconsistent
with “natural law.”215
However, in the real world, such an amorphous test would create
substantial costs.  Assessing legislation on general reasonableness grounds
is probably beyond the competence of most judges, who could not possibly
find the time to understand all of the tradeoffs among interest  groups
necessary to produce a particular statute.  Burdened parties, observing the
cloud of uncertainty surrounding every legislative enactment, would have
incentives to challenge every statute.  In view of the likelihood of error and
attendant costs, the constitutional doctrines considered below fall easily in
line with the error cost framework.
Bills of Attainder
The general requirements of the Constitution are that punishment not be
imposed retroactively,216 that the grounds for punishment be clearly
articulated,217 that persons independent of the legislative and executive
branches determine whether the grounds for punishment are established,218
and that the manner in which punishment is determined comport with
norms of due process (norms consonant with accurate decision-making).219
All of these restrictions on criminal punishment are designed to increase the
probability that punishment will serve public interests.
Direct imposition of punishment on individuals by the legislature—a bill
of attainder220—is suspect as it is more likely to be subject to manipulation
214 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
215 Justice Chase argued that “natural law,” in addition to the provisions of written
constitutions, constrained the power of governments (state and federal).  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) At
386-88.  A regime in which courts are free to invalidate legislation on the basis of natural law
theories would not differ greatly, if at all, from one in which courts apply a reasonableness
test to legislation.
216 See U.S.CONST. art. I., § 9, cl.3.
217 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
218 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
219 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
220 Historically, a bill of attainder was the legislative direction of capital punishment for
select individuals.  Other legislative punishments directed at particular individuals were bills
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in ways at odds with public interest, in no small measure because the
certainty of the enforcement target dramatically increases the risk of
opportunistic behavior.221  This is true not only of the immediate term, but
of the longer term as well.  For instance, the narrow interest of a temporary
legislative majority might be advanced by punishing political adversaries;
and lodging such a power in the legislature could undermine processes that
ordinarily would keep political power from becoming concentrated.
The seriousness of the concern, however, does not make it easy to
determine when it is triggered.  It is not enough that legislation has a
pronounced effect on a particular group or even a particular individual.  The
narrowness of the class punished of itself does not demonstrate that the
concerns behind the bill of attainder clause are engaged.  Indeed, even
legislation that singles an individual out—as happened with Richard Nixon
in legislation assigning ownership rights of certain presidential papers—can
be free from the sort of self-interest or group animus that threatens serious
distortion of public processes.222  At the same time, legislation that on its
face names no specific person nonetheless may be tailored to impose a
criminal punishment on particular individuals who are targeted because of
past actions and have little opportunity to avoid its penalties.223
Absent a ready metric to ascertain the propriety of a given legislative
burden, courts might want to determine whether the law is animated by licit
or illicit considerations -- put another way, by a specific intent to harm.224
This is, in fact, the approach used in assessing transgressions of the bill of
attainder clause.225  The alternative to an intent inquiry, a reasonableness
test, could easily be beyond the competence of courts and would surely
encourage challenges to every piece of legislation.  Courts, however, do not
inquire into legislators’ subjective intent—that inquiry would depend on
private information that is difficult to obtain in a reliable manner.  Instead,
the courts look at factors that would be congruent with illicit motive rather
of pain and punishment.  The constitutional provision, however, long has been interpreted to
cover both sorts of punishment.
221  This follows from and is the obverse of the intuition that individuals with limited
knowledge of their particular attributes will arrive at more just rules for their own
governance, see GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 28-29 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985).
222 See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
223 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
224 Dean Paul Brest has proposed a more general focus on this issue to determine when
unconstitutional discrimination has occurred.  See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV.  95.
225 See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468-84 (1977); Board of
Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
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than seeking directly to identify legislators’ intent from their own
statements or from similar evidence that is highly manipulable.
The courts’ construction of the bill of attainder clause, thus, appears
consistent with the error cost analysis presented in this paper.  The specific
intent feature of the clause’s construction helps reduce errors and
uncertainty that would exist if courts had the discretion afforded by a
reasonableness standard.  And use of an objective test for specific intent
avoids error costs (including administrative costs) connected to a subjective
intent inquiry.
Equal Protection
Equal protection analysis has evolved in a similar direction, though with
more controversy.  The language of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment is simple, but its instruction that no person be denied
equal protection of the laws cannot be implemented without substantial
analytical work.  Perhaps the clause’s lynchpin notion of “equality” is not
completely empty, as Peter Westen has urged.226  But Westen is plainly
correct that the notion of equality becomes meaningful only after we
specify what are relevant criteria for making distinctions, specification that
requires a theoretical grounding in something other than the notion of
likeness.
Rather than focusing on equality, the courts have followed a different
route to interpreting the equal protection clause.  First, they have identified
characteristics that seem especially likely to be subjects of animus among
government decision makers,227 and that seem least likely to correlate with
any legitimate basis for distinction among those benefitted or burdened by
government actions.  Race is the first characteristic on this list, but national
origin, sex, and other characteristics also are viewed as suspect bases for
distinguishing among citizens.228  These distinctions are not indefensible in
all cases, but they are sufficiently improbable, as serving public interest, to
bear special burdens of justification.229  Under strict scrutiny analysis, even
226 Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982);  see also
Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U.L. REV.387 (1985).
227 Agric v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional conception of
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”).
228 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  § 18.3 216-
221 (1999).
229 As a formal matter, the equal protection clause provides merely for a greater or a lesser
degree of scrutiny of government’s justification for a discrimination built into the law.  The
higher level of scrutiny is triggered by a “suspect classification” or by a government action
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discriminations that can be defended as serving legitimate public purposes
generally will be found wanting.230
Second, the courts have imposed a specific intent requirement in cases in
which facially neutral acts are asserted to discriminate among certain
groups and for discriminations along quasi-suspect lines (such as
residency).231  Commentators have suggested various tests for judging the
consistency of facially neutral legislation with equal protection.  Some have
urged analysis only of the effects of legislation, with “disparate impact” on
classes divided along suspect lines sufficient to invalidate a law.232  This is
equivalent to applying a general intent test.  Some commentators have
argued that the court should strike down legislation if it determines that the
legislation was in fact motivated by animus along suspect lines, applying a
subjective intent test.233  Some commentators have urged courts to ignore
the purpose behind legislation, upholding any legislation that has a
plausible, neutral justification for the law, applying a weak specific intent
test.234
that burdens a “fundamental right.”  United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938).]  In practice, however, the Court seems to use more stringent tests for race
than for national origin, for national origin than for sex, and so on.  RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, supra note 206 at §18.3 222-226; John Marquez Lundin, Making Equal
Protection Analysis Make Sense, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1191, 1193 (“while laws based on
alienage are ostensibly subject to strict scrutiny just like race-based action, in practice, the
Court routinely upholds immigration laws that make a mockery of the Due Process Clause.”).
230 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
231 Residency requirements assertedly burden a right to interstate travel.  Although that right
does not appear in the Constitution and has not been found to be among the fundamental
rights burdens on which require strict scrutiny, the courts have been unwilling to give
residency requirements highly deferential review.  See, e.g., Hooper v. Bernadillo County
Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 62-3 (1982).
232 E.g., Gayle Binion, “Intent” and Equal Protection: a Reconsideration, 1983 SUP. CT.
REV. 397; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate
Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36
(1977).
233 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 224, at 95 (courts should determine whether “illicit motive
played a significant role in the decision-making process, and if so, to construe the law in
terms of the classifications established by impact.”). Thus, if racial animus explained a law,
the law would be judged as a discrimination along racial lines that could be upheld if it was
essential to serve a compelling state interest (a virtual impossibility if motivated by animus).
See also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
297 (1997) (urging both a more vigorous purpose review in many instances and a more
deferential review in other cases).
234 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 211, at 136-45 (1980); Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality
in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049
(1979).
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The courts have not followed any of these paths, instead applying a
strong or credible objective specific intent standard.  Courts, thus, will
strike down laws that even though supported by a rational connection to a
legitimate government purpose seem too weakly connected to that purpose
and too closely connected to the sort of animus that prompts equal
protection concerns.235  But they will uphold against equal protection
challenge laws that pass modest rational basis review in the absence of a
showing that illicit animus is the law’s likely motivation.236
Although criticized from many different directions, this approach is
entirely consistent with the error cost framework developed here.  The
general intent approach would be widely over-inclusive, generating many
false convictions, occasionally under-inclusive, and impose enormous costs
associated with uncertainty and with administrative costs.  If any benefit or
burden along suspect lines suffices to invalidate legislation, virtually all
actions are open to challenge, with a large attendant cost from strategic
litigation.
The subjective intent approach also is inconsistent with the error cost
framework.  Because of the difficulty of determining subjective intent,
uncertainty surrounding the validity of legislation would be at least as great
under the subjective intent test as under the general intent test.  The social
costs associated with a subjective intent test should be of the same
magnitude as those associated with the general intent test.  Recognizing the
uncertainty problem, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the subjective intent
test in Palmer v. Thompson,237 on the grounds that
it is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of
different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment. . . . [T]here is an
element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad
motives of its supporters.  If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than
because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as
the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons.238
 The weak specific intent approach is more consistent with the error cost
framework and with the law, but it contains too high a risk of false
negatives.  Discriminatory actions motivated by racial animus or other
illegitimate purpose often can be camouflaged by somewhat plausible
justifications.  If courts were to demand nothing more than a reasonable
235 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982);
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
236 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976).
237 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
238 403 U.S. at 224-5.
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justification for government actions, virtually no action would be found to
violate the equal protection guarantee, no matter how malevolent in purpose
and effect.
By adopting a strong specific intent test that seeks to establish an
inference of specific intent based on evidence, not on the ex-post
rationalizations of litigants, courts have marked out the path that is most
consistent with the error cost model of this paper.  The courts have not
gotten bogged down in analysis of legislative effects, even where there is no
realistic claim that legislation was the product of animus, nor have they
gotten bogged down in analysis of specific individual government actors’
motivations.  And they have not allowed a specious explanation to exculpate
when government actions are more likely to be understood as products of
illicit animus than of other purposes.
First Amendment Speech Protection
Another field of constitutional law in which the courts have applied a
specific intent requirement is first amendment protection of speech rights.
The first amendment’s free speech guarantee is one of the Constitution’s
most opaque provisions.  History suggests that it had an extremely limited
focus, though we are well beyond that.239  Certainly, we are well beyond the
text.  The commitment that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech” does not apply merely to Congress, nor to law-making,
nor even to activity that most citizens would describe as speech.240
What has emerged from judicial construction of the freedom of speech
clause over the past century is a focus on special sources of distrust.241  The
courts have been wary of government speech regulation that is especially apt
to be the product of self-interest—as where the speech is directly critical of
the speech-regulating official or of a superior officer—or that is especially
apt to be the product of animus.242  The more tolerant treatment of
239 Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of
Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1291 (1998).
240 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts,
34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 267-82 (1997).
241 See Blasi, supra note 189; Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public
Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV 554 (1991); Frederick Schauer, The
Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1989).
242 Blasi, supra note 189, at 567-9; Ronald A. Cass, Perils of Positive Thinking:
Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1405, 1454 - 6 (1987).
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commercial speech243 and of “time, place, and manner” regulation244 along
with the more stringent requirements for message-specific speech
restraints245 reflect this approach.246
These divisions are sensitive to the likely error costs of judicial policing
of speech regulation, which necessarily includes attention to the error costs
attending regulation itself.247  The courts have not assessed the
reasonableness of regulation standing alone, an approach that would
generate high error and administrative costs. The approach they have
followed looks very much like an objective specific intent approach, where
indicia of regulation that correlate with a significant risk of illicit intent, in
circumstances in which error costs associated with the speech regulation
will be high, very substantially increases the burden on the government to
justify the regulation.248
VI. Conclusion
Intent has been a controversial issue in the law, and particularly in antitrust.
The error-cost theory of legal standards set out in this article explains and
justifies the role of intent analysis in antitrust and in other areas of the law.
The structure of intent rules can be understood by focusing on the goal of
minimizing the total cost of legal error, which is determined by the
frequencies and costs of false acquittals and false convictions and the
administrative costs associated with making the requisite decisions.  As a
general rule, proof of specific intent—an intent to engage in conduct that
violates the law for a particular (bad) reason or with a particular
understanding of its harmful effect—is required where the costs of false
243 See Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 764 (1975).
244 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
245 See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, U.S. (1937); Gitlow v. New York, U.S. (1925); Stone .  The
concern extends to forms of regulation that are readily administered as message regulation as
well as forms that expressly target particular messages.  See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 493 U.S. 490 (1981); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
246 Cass, supra note 188; Farber, supra note 219; Stone, supra note 188.
247 Cass, supra note 189.
248 It is important to emphasize that the test here is not simply one of intent.  See, e.g.,
Posner, supra note 202. There is no evidence that speech regulation more frequently and
systematically departs from social welfare-optimization where commercial speech is
regulated, for example, than where political speech is regulated.  Regulation of commercial
speech, however, is likely to impose lower error costs, both because the process costs of
verifying truth are lower in this context and because the speech, responsive to profit-
incentives, is apt to be more resistant to regulation than the broad run of political speech.  See
Cass, supra note 189, at 1361-81.
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convictions are high relative to those of false acquittals.  This error-cost
approach explains the allocation of burdens and sorts of proof required
under the specific intent tests in antitrust, and in many other areas of law as
well.
